Russia
Source: forum2026.dombrics.com

From October 21 to 24, St. Petersburg will host the BRICS+ Business Forum—the flagship event of Business Week, which will unite it with the 30th International Forum and Exhibition "Russian Industrialist."

The forum will take place at the ExpoForum Convention and Exhibition Centre, supported by the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP), the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation, and the Government of St. Petersburg.

October 21: Opening and Initial Strategic Sessions

The first day will set the tone for the entire program. The forum will open with a plenary session titled "Connecting BRICS, Building the Future: Project Cooperation as a Driver of Sustainable Growth."
Throughout the day, strategic sessions will be held focusing on BRICS food stability and tourism exchange between Russia and African countries—with an emphasis on developing direct air traffic and jointly promoting destinations.

A special feature of the day is the business game "How Companies from BRICS+ Countries Can Establish Reliable Communications in Russia." This is a practical tool for those just entering the market who want to avoid common pitfalls. The day will conclude with a gala reception for the BRICS+ Business Forum.

October 22: Exhibition and Joint Meetings

The main event of the second day is the opening of the BRICS+ Business Forum exhibition. It will feature country pavilions, partner booths, and the central "BRICS+ House" zone.

On the same day, a joint meeting with the "Russian Industrialist" will be held: "Project Cooperation: BRICS+ Opportunities for Industrial Development in Modern Realities. From Plans to Implementation." Concurrent sessions will cover export-import management in the gas industry featuring Vietnam, Sierra Leone, Indonesia, and Russia, alongside a block of closed events for delegates and VIP participants. For those who want to see production from the inside, an "Industrial Tourism" block has been organized, offering excursions to 10 enterprises in St. Petersburg.

October 23: International Track and Technological Leadership

The third day is the most action-packed in terms of parallel tracks. It will begin with the official opening of the "Russian Industrialist" and an exhibition tour, followed by a plenary session titled "Industrial Achievements as the Main Vector of the Country's Technological Leadership," and a meeting of the Coordinating Council on Industry dedicated to implementing the Russian Federation's export-import strategy.

As part of the BRICS+ Business Forum, this day will feature the following sessions:
  "Space as a Territory of International Cooperation"
  "BRICS+ Industrial Clusters: Synergy of Resources and Competencies"
  "Crypto Mining and International Cooperation in Artificial Intelligence"
  "Transport and Logistics Corridors: Connecting Continents"

Running in parallel will be the "International Cooperation and Export" track: a Russian-Serbian scientific and technological conference, sessions on engaging with the Middle Eastern (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq) and Indian markets, blocks hosted by RSPP Commissions and Committees, and joint events with banks such as PSB, Sberbank, and others. Award ceremonies will take place throughout the day.

October 24: Human Resources, Regions, and Football

The final day is dedicated to human resources potential and the regional agenda. Sessions will cover international student exchanges between St. Petersburg and BRICS+ countries, the "Industry in the Regions" block, and Youth Day. The morning will kick off with an "Industrial Breakfast" featuring representatives from the Ministry of Industry

India
Source: www.pib.gov.in

12th BRICS Parliamentary Forum to be Held in the Central Hall of Samvidhan Sadan on 26–27 October 2026: Lok Sabha SpeakerThe Prime Minister of India will grace the forum and meet the leaders of visiting delegations: Lok Sabha Speaker

Presiding Officers of Parliaments, Members of Parliament and other dignitaries from BRICS member and partner countries to deliberate on strategic priorities for parliaments: Lok Sabha Speaker

Global parliamentary leaders to assemble in New Delhi for the conference being hosted under India's chairship on the theme of people-centric development: Lok Sabha Speaker

Deliberations to cover parliamentary functioning in relation to institutional resilience, ethical AI and digital transformation, global governance reforms and sustainable development: Lok Sabha Speaker

International Affairs Committees of BRICS member and partner countries to discuss parliamentary diplomacy, capacity building and the exchange of best practices: Lok Sabha Speaker

Posted On: 22 OCT 2026 4:03PM by PIB Delhi

The Parliament of India will host the 12th BRICS Parliamentary Forum on 26 and 27 October 2026 in the Central Hall of Samvidhan Sadan. The conference will be inaugurated on 26 October.

Addressing a press conference at Parliament House today, Lok Sabha Speaker Shri Om Birla said that the conference marks a new chapter in the history of India's parliamentary diplomacy. It will bring together Presiding Officers and parliamentary leaders from BRICS member and partner countries, Union Ministers, Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha Shri Harivansh, Presiding Officers of State Legislatures, Members of Parliament and other dignitaries.

The Lok Sabha Speaker stated that the Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi would grace the event and meet the leaders of the visiting delegations.

He further stated that the conference would feature bilateral and multilateral interactions with the leaders of visiting delegations and parliamentary friendship groups. A meeting of the Secretaries of the delegations will be held on 25 October 2026 to finalise the Joint Statement of the 12th BRICS Parliamentary Forum.

Highlighting the central theme of the programme, he said that the Forum would deliberate on the overarching theme of “Strengthening Parliaments for People-Centric Development.”

He added that, building on the legacy of the BRICS Parliamentary Forum, the 12th BRICS Parliamentary
Forum would facilitate consensus-based dialogue through the following four high-level sessions:

(i) Resilience: The critical role of parliaments in strengthening institutions to ensure a better future.
(ii) Innovation: Promoting human-centred innovation in artificial intelligence and digital technologies through parliaments.
(iii) Cooperation: Ensuring a more representative system of global governance through parliamentary cooperation.
(iv) Sustainability: The role of parliaments in ensuring a sustainable and inclusive future for our countries.

In addition, a special meeting of the Chairpersons of the International Affairs Committees of the parliaments of BRICS member and partner countries will be held to deliberate on parliamentary diplomacy, capacity building and the exchange of best practices.

Shri Birla further stated that, alongside high-level plenary sessions, parallel meetings and bilateral exchanges, the conference would also feature a cultural programme. The Vice-President of India will host a banquet in honour of the distinguished guests.

Members of the delegations will visit the Parliament of India and also enjoy cultural visits in Delhi. The conference will conclude on 27 October.

United Kingdom
Source: worldanalytics.press

Recently, I delivered a presentation at the Russian Academy of Sciences on the role of BRICS in addressing the conflict in the Middle East. The discussion raised a fundamental question about the group’s international relevance: to what extent can an increasingly influential association of emerging powers contribute to resolving a major geopolitical crisis when its members hold divergent positions and maintain competing regional interests?

The answer requires a realistic assessment of BRICS’ institutional character and the political considerations shaping its members’ foreign policies.

The expansion of BRICS has increased its economic weight and diplomatic reach. Nevertheless, the group remains primarily a platform for intergovernmental coordination rather than a formal international organization equipped with binding decision-making mechanisms and a unified foreign policy. Its members maintain regular consultations, pursue economic cooperation, and issue joint declarations, but these activities do not automatically translate into coordinated action during armed conflicts.

The Middle East illustrates this limitation particularly clearly. Iran and the United Arab Emirates belong to BRICS while occupying opposing positions in the current military confrontation. Tehran considers American military infrastructure in the region a central element of the threat it faces, while the UAE seeks to protect its territory and critical infrastructure from Iranian missiles and drones. The presence of American forces on Emirati soil places Abu Dhabi in a particularly sensitive position, regardless of whether Iran considers the country itself its principal adversary.

Other members face similarly complex calculations. Egypt maintains important relations with Israel, while India combines longstanding ties with Iran with a strategic partnership with Israel. Meanwhile, China’s rivalry with India remains an important feature of Asian geopolitics, despite diplomatic efforts to stabilize bilateral relations. These differences prevent BRICS from adopting a common strategic position on every major international crisis.

The frequently invoked objective of establishing a multipolar world order does little to eliminate these contradictions. Multipolarity itself carries different meanings across the group’s membership. Brazilian foreign policy discourse often associates it with multilateral institutions and international governance, including the United Nations. Russia, China, and Iran, however, place greater emphasis on redistributing global power and reducing the capacity of Western states to impose their strategic preferences on other countries.

Consequently, BRICS lacks a fully shared geopolitical doctrine. Its cohesion rests primarily on the combined economic and political weight of its members and their recognition that the international system cannot be transformed without their participation. This common interest provides a foundation for cooperation, although it remains insufficient to establish a unified approach to every regional conflict.
These structural limitations define what BRICS can realistically accomplish in the Middle East. The group cannot be expected to endorse Iran’s military position collectively, nor is it likely to become a unified negotiating intermediary. The interests of its Arab members, particularly the UAE, make such an arrangement politically implausible. Likewise, most BRICS countries do not support eliminating the State of Israel.

However, significant opportunities for coordinated diplomatic action remain. Members can oppose attacks against civilians, condemn violations of international humanitarian law, and demand accountability for the destruction affecting Palestine, Lebanon, and Iran. Such positions can establish common ground without requiring every member to adopt identical strategic objectives.

Joint declarations at BRICS summits have already provided a framework for expressing humanitarian concerns. The challenge is to translate diplomatic language into practical measures, including coordinated initiatives for humanitarian assistance, sustained international pressure against violations of international law, and diplomatic efforts to prevent further escalation.

Whether BRICS can pursue these objectives effectively depends on decisions about its institutional future. If its members want the group to exercise greater influence over international crises, they will need to develop clearer procedures, establish concrete long-term priorities, and identify areas where collective action is possible despite strategic disagreements.

The Middle East conflict therefore presents BRICS with a significant test. Its capacity to influence the international order will depend not only on the combined power of its members, but also on their willingness to convert shared interests into sustained political action.

Israel
Source: www.inss.org.il

Between Declarations and Actions: BRICS and the Internationalization of the Chinese Agenda
How is China leveraging BRICS's transition from declarations to practical mechanisms to advance its global agenda, and what are the strategic implications for the Middle East and Israel?

The BRICS summit held in New Delhi in September 2026 demonstrated the organization’s gradual evolution from a forum based primarily on declarations and political and economic coordination into a framework that is also developing practical mechanisms in technology, industry, health, agriculture, and space. For China, this process carries additional significance: BRICS enables it to advance ideas and initiatives originating in Beijing within a multilateral framework it does not control, thereby contributing to the internationalization of China’s global agenda. The article examines these trends, how they were reflected at the New Delhi summit, and their potential implications for the Middle East and Israel.

The 18th BRICS Summit, held in New Delhi on September 12–13, 2026, was marked by an effort to deepen cooperation among member states and give it more practical expression. Alongside familiar positions on multipolarity, strengthening the status of the "Global South," reforming international institutions, and expanding the representation of developing nations, the summit highlighted two interconnected trends. The first is BRICS’s gradual evolution from a forum for political and economic coordination into a framework that is also building professional, technological, and institutional networks in industry, technology, health, agriculture, and space. The second is China’s effort to use this process to advance ideas, areas of activity, and mechanisms that it is developing itself within a multilateral framework not under its exclusive control. Precisely because India, Brazil, South Africa, and other countries help shape the agenda and make decisions, turning ideas originating in Beijing into BRICS initiatives is intended, under this approach, to give them a broader international foundation and legitimacy. In other words, the forum can be viewed as an additional platform for internationalizing the Chinese agenda.

Both trends remain a work in progress. In many instances, the summit continued trends and decisions announced at earlier summits, including in artificial intelligence, which generated considerable headlines. It is therefore important to distinguish among three stages: announcing initiatives, establishing mechanisms and institutions to advance them, and implementing them in practice. In many areas, BRICS has already advanced from the first stage to the second, but whether many of these mechanisms will be implemented and will have a practical impact remains an open question. The summit's significance, then, lies in serving as another building block in a process of the gradual accumulation of mechanisms that may, over time, give cooperation among member states a more practical and institutionalized dimension—even without the emergence of a cohesive economic or political bloc.

From Declarations to Mechanisms

In the economic sphere, the summit continued efforts to connect payment systems, expand the use of local currencies, and strengthen the New Development Bank (NDB). At the same time, industrial cooperation expanded in smart manufacturing and robotics, solar energy, small and medium-sized businesses, and standardization. The New Delhi Declaration places particular emphasis on value and supply chains, technological cooperation, and increasing the share of developing countries in higher value-added stages of global production. Cooperation in standardization is especially important in this context, as it demonstrates how political coordination can gradually be linked to production, trade, and shared technical standards.

The expansion of these mechanisms, however, does not in itself indicate that BRICS is consolidating into an economic bloc. Although trade among member states has grown rapidly, reaching approximately $1.17 trillion in 2024, part of this increase stemmed from external shocks and trade diversion, as well as the expansion of the organization itself in that year, which reclassified existing trade flows with Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, and Ethiopia as "intra-BRICS trade." Furthermore, while BRICS countries account for roughly 24 percent of global goods exports, trade among them amounts to less than five percent of that total, characterized by considerable asymmetry and China's central role. These figures support the possibility of gradually expanding the use of national currencies in transactions among member states, but provide a much weaker basis for the idea of a common BRICS currency. In addition, as intra-bloc trade becomes more concentrated around China, de-dollarization in some cases may actually expand the use of the yuan rather than create a balanced, multi-currency system. This limits the appeal of such de-dollarization for many member states.

A similar trend of shifting from declarations to the creation of mechanisms is evident in health and agriculture. During 2026, BRICS advanced mechanisms for cooperation in combating infectious diseases, networks of health institutes and centers of excellence, vaccine development, and coordination among regulatory authorities for medical products. It also advanced a digital agriculture network, cooperation on agricultural inputs and genetic resources, and a network of centers of excellence for ecological and regenerative agriculture. Work continued on the idea of a BRICS grain exchange. These mechanisms are still taking shape, but they are laying the groundwork for cooperation in areas that could eventually have a direct impact on production, regulation, and trade.

Space cooperation, too, has moved beyond declarations to some extent. BRICS operates a mechanism that pools data from member states’ remote-sensing satellites for disaster management, agriculture, and environmental monitoring. In 2026, work advanced on extending this mechanism to the organization's new member states and developing a broader institutional framework for space cooperation, including discussions on establishing a BRICS space council. This area is particularly interesting because it brings existing national capabilities—including those of China, India, and Russia—into a multilateral framework. Space cooperation also intersects with many other fields, from agriculture to further scientific and technological collaboration.

Internationalizing the Chinese Agenda

Against this backdrop, the nature of the initiatives presented by Chinese President Xi Jinping in New Delhi stands out. They are not intended to turn BRICS into an economic union, create a common currency, or establish a common market. Rather, they would add layers of cooperation in areas where China itself has significant capabilities and advantages. Xi presented five concrete initiatives: in artificial intelligence, promoting an open-source community and cooperation in the development and application of large models; in trade and investment, deepening cooperation among special economic zones and establishing a BRICS Forum on Trade in Services in China in 2027; in the digital economy, establishing a cloud platform for the organization's digital ecosystem; in smart manufacturing, cooperating on smart factories, standards, and norms; and in human capital, expanding cooperation in engineering education and vocational training, mutual recognition of professional qualification standards, and youth exchanges in science and technology. These proposals share a common denominator: building additional layers of connectivity, standardization, knowledge, and shared institutions. Xi also linked the initiatives to China’s 15th Five-Year Plan, which he described as both a blueprint for China’s development and a “list of cooperation” with the world.

For China, the summit is also a step toward preparing to assume the organization’s chairmanship in 2027, when it will host the 19th summit. The New Delhi Declaration explicitly expresses the member states’ support for China’s upcoming chairmanship, and Beijing itself is already emphasizing continuity between the Indian and Chinese presidencies. Xi’s five initiatives could enable China to enter 2027 with some of the agenda it seeks to advance already extending beyond a purely Chinese initiative: it has been placed on the BRICS table, discussed in a multilateral forum, and, in some areas, may begin to be institutionalized.

This points to BRICS’s broader significance for Chinese foreign policy. Beijing does not have to establish organizations under its control or persuade its partners to explicitly adopt a “Chinese model” in order to expand its influence. It can advance parts of its agenda through multilateral institutions over which it has no formal or exclusive control. BRICS is a good example of this: India led the organization in 2026, decisions are made by consensus, and its members have different, and sometimes conflicting, interests. Precisely because of this, the adoption of ideas promoted by China in such a forum gives them additional significance. Ideas concerning the "Global South," sovereignty and equality among states, changes to global governance, AI, smart manufacturing, or the concept of "common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security" can undergo a process of internationalization: moving from proposals and concepts originating in China to a common language, initiatives, and multilateral mechanisms. In doing so, they gain broader legitimacy as international ideas, rather than being seen solely as part of an agenda originating in Beijing.

From the Regional to the Global

In this respect, there is also interesting continuity between BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO Summit in Bishkek, held about two weeks earlier, illustrated how China operates within a regional framework to connect sovereignty, security, development, and cooperation with concrete institutions and mechanisms. BRICS operates on a global scale, giving similar principles broader reach among a larger number of countries. The two organizations differ in their membership and roles, and should not be viewed as parts of a single structure controlled from Beijing. From China’s perspective, however, they can fulfill complementary roles: the SCO as a regional framework for developing mechanisms for security and cooperation, and BRICS as a broader forum for advancing concepts of governance, economics, development, and technology. Over the years, the areas promoted by the two organizations have also increasingly overlapped: the SCO is giving greater prominence to economic issues, while BRICS is gradually expanding its engagement with security issues.

The connection between the regional and global levels is especially evident in the initiative Xi presented in Egypt in early September, immediately following the SCO Summit, for a "new security architecture in the Middle East." This initiative emphasizes greater responsibility for regional states in ensuring their own security, a comprehensive concept of security, links between security and development, and international coordination, alongside sovereignty and non-interference. According to this approach, responses to conflicts should emerge first and foremost from within the region and its states, while broader frameworks provide an international envelope. The BRICS Declaration does not adopt the Chinese initiative as such, but it includes some of the same concepts: indivisible security, political and diplomatic solutions, and a significant role for regional organizations.

The Middle East in the New Delhi Declaration

The Middle East features prominently in the New Delhi Declaration. Regarding the Palestinians, the declaration addresses the ceasefire in Gaza, humanitarian aid, opposition to forced displacement, and support for a sovereign and viable Palestinian state within 1967 borders, encompassing the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, with East Jerusalem as its capital. It supports full UN membership for Palestine and also references the proceedings brought by South Africa against Israel before the International Court of Justice.

Regarding Lebanon, the wording of the New Delhi Declaration is particularly direct: BRICS calls for the implementation of Resolution 1701, condemns continued violations of the ceasefire and of Lebanese sovereignty, and calls on Israel to honor its understandings with the Lebanese government and withdraw its forces from Lebanese territory where they are still present. The declaration also addresses UNIFIL, in which several BRICS countries participate, condemning attacks on its personnel and facilities. Regarding Syria, the declaration emphasizes sovereignty and territorial integrity, calls for a Syrian-led political process, and demands the withdrawal of "occupying forces," without explicitly naming Israel in that clause. Iran is likewise not mentioned in connection with the war in the Middle East/West Asia, with the emphasis in this context being on the general principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity, a call for restraint and diplomacy, and concern over attacks on civilian nuclear facilities subject to IAEA safeguards—a formulation that is, of course, also relevant to the Russia-Ukraine War.

In this context, it is interesting to consider how much the New Delhi Declaration differs from the SCO's Bishkek Declaration, published in early September. In Bishkek, Iran’s rights received extensive attention, while Israel was not mentioned by name. In New Delhi, the emphasis regarding the regional war was on restraint, preventing escalation, and returning to dialogue and diplomacy, while Israel received significant attention. Iran was at the center of the Middle East discussion in Bishkek; in New Delhi, the discussion of the region was much broader. The difference also illustrates the limits of Chinese influence: the two organizations’ different memberships and the interests of their other members affect the joint output. Precisely because of this, when an idea or formulation promoted by Beijing manages to win support within such a forum, it holds a multilateral value for China that is absent from a unilateral Chinese declaration.

Against the backdrop of this broad agenda, the limited scope of Xi's visit to India stood out. He arrived in New Delhi on the afternoon of September 12 and stayed in India for only about twenty-four hours, amid a gradual and cautious effort to stabilize China–India relations following the 2020 border crisis. Relations have improved since, but the border issue, trade imbalance, supply chains, and market access remain central points of contention. Based on official reports, Xi held only one official bilateral meeting—with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi—and did not attend the leaders' gala dinner, without giving an official explanation. This is a reminder that the deepening institutionalization of BRICS does not eliminate disagreements or competition among its members, particularly between Asia’s two largest members.

Implications for Israel

From Israel's perspective, these processes warrant examination across three interconnected levels: the technological-economic, the diplomatic, and in the long term, the strategic. On the first level, the significance is not merely the volume of trade with China, but the evolution of BRICS as a more practical network of technological, industrial, and institutional cooperation. Standardization, smart factories, AI, space, health, and agriculture gain added weight when they connect China with key Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates. Israel should therefore monitor not only its bilateral relations with China, but also the systems, standards, and mechanisms China is developing with third parties in the region.

The second level is diplomatic and security-related. The New Delhi Declaration illustrates that the expanded BRICS is capable of reaching agreement on detailed language regarding conflicts in the Middle East. On several issues, above all Lebanon and the Palestinian issue, the language is distinctly critical of Israeli policy. At the same time, the differences between the BRICS and SCO declarations show that their positions are not simply a reflection of China’s own; they result from negotiations among countries with different interests.

In the long term, the more important question for Israel is whether the two processes—the development of practical mechanisms within BRICS and the SCO, and China’s effort to advance broader approaches to governance and regional and global security—will converge. China does not need formal control over these organizations to influence the language, agenda, and mechanisms evolving within them. As ideas originating in Beijing find expression within a multilateral framework, they can become part of a broader international discourse and action. The new security architecture for the Middle East proposed by Xi is an important test of this process: will it remain primarily a Chinese conceptual and rhetorical framework, or will it gradually connect with regional and international institutions, partners, and mechanisms, and translate into practical influence? The evidence will lie less in further declarations than in the establishment of permanent institutions, the allocation of resources, the adoption of shared standards, the creation of cross-border projects, and the formation of active coordination mechanisms.

The possible impact of these processes on the standing of the United States must also be considered. The question is not necessarily whether BRICS, the SCO, or new Chinese initiatives will replace the United States in the Middle East, but whether they expand the options available to regional states and gradually reduce their reliance on an international framework in which Washington holds a dominant status. This does not necessarily mean distancing themselves from the United States: countries in the region can expand their participation in frameworks that include China while simultaneously maintaining close security and economic ties with Washington. However, as alternatives proliferate in trade, technology, finance, security, and diplomacy, their room for maneuver may also expand. For Israel, the central question is how the expansion of these frameworks and alternatives will affect the position and involvement of the United States in the region—and, in turn, Israel’s room for maneuver.
The opinions expressed in INSS publications are the authors’ alone.

Ori Sela

Dr. Ori Sela is a senior visiting researcher at the Israel-China Policy Center - The Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation at the INSS. He is also a senior lecturer (Associate Professor) in the Department of East Asian Studies at Tel Aviv University, of which he served as Chair until late 2022. He specializes in the history of Early-Modern and Modern China, and is interested particularly in the reciprocal relationship between intellectual history and socio-political history at various crossroads in China's past, as well as in the history of science and technology, military history, and China's international relations. The transition from China's imperial era into the nation-state building of the twentieth century, along with the crucial roles history has played and continues to play in current affairs, is another facet of his research and teaching, specifically as it pertains to contemporary China.

Russia
Source: russiancouncil.ru

September's BRICS declaration gave payment cooperation a new practical direction: continued work on interoperability and local-currency settlements. The challenge behind that language is less visible than a summit announcement. Someone still has to supply the currency an exporter wants, at a price that makes the transaction worthwhile. Connecting payment messages does not settle that commercial question. The New Delhi Declaration acknowledges studies of payment and messaging interoperability and encourages the BRICS Payment Task Force to continue discussions. It also recognizes different national priorities. That leaves room for useful cooperation without requiring members to adopt a single monetary arrangement. For Russia and its trading partners, the most productive next step would be to evaluate proposed corridors through the currency liquidity they can reliably support.

Now, consider the distinction between invoicing and conversion. Two companies may agree to price a shipment in a member country's currency. The exporter might nevertheless need another currency to pay its suppliers. Removing one conversion from the customer's payment journey may simply move it to a bank or the exporter's treasury. The economic saving depends on the entire chain, including the price of converting or holding the proceeds after the invoice is paid.

Trade imbalances, however, make this harder. Where payments mostly flow in one direction, a provider accumulating the source currency must decide how to use or exchange it. Thus, a large headline trade total does not establish a balanced currency market. Providers will price the cost of managing that position, including funding and risk. An arrangement that works for a few transactions may therefore become more expensive when demand expands or market conditions deteriorate.

The Nexus initiative offers a useful comparison outside the BRICS framework. Developed through work with Asian central banks, it is designed to connect domestic instant payment systems; its documentation distinguishes payment providers from foreign exchange providers and institutions supplying settlement access. The separation makes an important economic responsibility visible: a payment link requires a party able to exchange currencies and access the relevant systems. Its design offers a lesson for BRICS, whose payment cooperation has its own institutions and national constraints. For this reason, BRICS authorities should make all corresponding questions explicit in any corridor assessment. Who supplies each currency when demand rises sharply? What happens when a provider stops quoting or its available balance runs low? Answers should identify the party bearing the cost of replenishing liquidity and the conditions under which a customer can receive a firm quote. A technically open connection is of limited use when the only available exchange rate makes an ordinary commercial payment unattractive.

In this sense, measurement should follow the business transaction. Providers could publish comparable results for permitted payments on specified corridors, showing the total cost in both currencies and when funds become usable by the recipient. Here, exchange margins belong in that calculation even if the advertised transfer fee is small. In addition, failed or delayed payments should remain in the evidence, rather than disappear from an average based only on successful transfers. Those measures would give firms a basis for comparing a proposed route with their existing arrangements.

Hence, the concern is broader than BRICS: the Financial Stability Board's October 2025 assessment found that extensive policy work had not yet produced the desired gains for end-users globally.

Institutional progress and commercial usefulness can advance at different speeds and that is a reason to give actual customer outcomes greater weight than the number of agreements or connected institutions. Afterall, financial autonomy is a legitimate objective, and policymakers may value an additional route even before it is the cheapest. Resilience, on the other hand, has economic value. However, a route that depends on one dominant liquidity provider can replace one concentration with another. For this reason, cooperation should widen credible choices, with clear responsibility for settlement and compliance, rather than obscure where the dependence has moved.

In terms of Russia, the country can contribute to a more useful BRICS payments agenda by pressing for transparent corridor economics. Start with transactions for which both sides have a sustainable reason to hold or exchange the currencies involved, and expand as evidence supports it. The enduring achievement would be a business receiving spendable proceeds on predictable terms. Such an arrangement would be a stronger foundation for monetary cooperation than asking a payment platform to carry the ambitions of a reserve currency.

Russia
Source: tass.com

Indian ambassador to Russia Vinay Kumar also noted that the two states continue to pursue the course of deepening relations

MOSCOW, October 24. /TASS/. Russia and India plan to increase their trade turnover to $100 billion by 2030, Indian ambassador to Russia Vinay Kumar said in an interview with TASS after the second Russian·Indian business forum Time.

He said that the two states continue to pursue the course of deepening relations, striving to push the trade volume to $100 billion and mutual investment to $50 billion by 2030.

Earlier, Manpreet Singh, President of the Indian Chamber of International Business, told TASS at the II Russian·Indian Time forum that trade turnover between Russia and India could reach $500 billion within the next three years if an agreement on free trade between India and the Eurasian Economic Union is signed.

About the forum

The II Russian·Indian business forum Time was held in Kazan from October 15 to 16. The event was aimed at developing Russian·Indian trade and economic cooperation. During the forum, the participants discussed ways to implement joint initiatives, promising investment projects, and opportunities for technological and economic cooperation. TASS is the forum’s information partner.