Singapore
Source: asiatimes.com

In BRICS open-source AI, China and India will make a good team

The resulting partnership could extend beyond the two countries to other BRICS members and developing economies

At the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed that China take the lead in establishing a BRICS AI open-source community.

His proposal envisaged cooperation in developing and applying large language models, conducting AI training and seminars and constructing a more open AI ecosystem. He also called for a broader international framework for AI governance.

Although India has not yet publicly endorsed the specific China-led initiative, there is considerable conceptual convergence between China’s proposal and India’s own emphasis on making AI more accessible, inclusive and oriented toward global development.

The New Delhi Declaration adopted at the 18th BRICS Summit emphasized international cooperation to improve accessibility to AI resources while ensuring safety, security, inclusiveness and reliability, particularly for the Global South.

Democratizing access to artificial intelligence

AI development is currently characterized by a high degree of technological and financial concentration. The most advanced computing infrastructure, foundation models, semiconductor capabilities, cloud systems and research ecosystems remain concentrated in a relatively small number of countries and companies. This creates a structural asymmetry between technological leaders and developing economies.

Open-source, or more broadly open, AI ecosystems can potentially reduce some of these barriers. Countries that cannot independently invest billions of dollars in frontier AI infrastructure could nevertheless develop applications, adapt models to local languages and circumstances, train researchers and build domestic technological capabilities. Such an approach could also facilitate the diffusion of knowledge and reduce some of the institutional and financial barriers that currently constrain participation in frontier AI development.

This is particularly relevant for the Global South. India has already placed considerable emphasis on the principle of “AI for All”, with its 2026 AI Impact Summit advocating collaborative, trusted, resilient and inclusive AI development. The New Delhi Declaration emerging from the summit emphasized broadening access, democratizing AI resources, developing human capital and using AI for economic growth and social good. The declaration was ultimately endorsed by 92 countries and international organizations.

China’s proposal at the recent BRICS Summit can similarly be understood as an effort to construct a wider technological ecosystem in which developing countries have greater access to AI capabilities. Xi’s proposal specifically includes cooperation on large language models, specialized training and seminars, and the creation of an open AI ecosystem.

Why China and India cooperation in open AI matters

India and China possess very different political systems, economic structures and approaches to technology governance. Nevertheless, they share an important characteristic: both are major developing economies with large populations, substantial technological capabilities and significant ambitions in artificial intelligence.

India possesses an enormous pool of software engineers, scientists, entrepreneurs and digital consumers. Its experience with digital public infrastructure, payments, identity systems and large-scale digital platforms provides an important foundation for AI applications. India’s AI Impact Summit also placed particular emphasis on democratizing access to AI resources and ensuring that AI contributes to economic growth and social development.

China, meanwhile, possesses considerable capabilities in AI research, manufacturing, computing infrastructure, telecommunications, robotics and industrial applications. Xi’s proposal specifically links open AI cooperation with broader technological and industrial cooperation, including large language models, training and the construction of an open AI ecosystem. Combining these complementary capabilities could create opportunities that neither country could easily realize alone.

India could contribute software expertise, entrepreneurial capacity, digital public infrastructure and applications for a highly diverse and multilingual society. China could contribute manufacturing capabilities, hardware ecosystems, computing infrastructure and experience in large-scale industrial deployment.

The resulting partnership could extend beyond the two countries to other BRICS members and developing economies. Rather than treating AI simply as a domain of technological competition among major powers, India and China could explore whether selected areas of technological co-development could serve broader developmental objectives.

Open AI as strategic autonomy

The emerging AI landscape is increasingly associated with geopolitical competition. Access to advanced semiconductors, computing capacity, cloud infrastructure and sophisticated AI models is becoming increasingly intertwined with national security and strategic power. For countries outside the principal technology blocs, excessive dependence on any single technological ecosystem can create strategic vulnerabilities.

India has explicitly sought to avoid such dependence. Its AI diplomacy has emphasized strategic autonomy, international cooperation and broad accessibility. The New Delhi BRICS Declaration similarly states that international cooperation in enhancing access to AI resources should be accompanied by safety, security, inclusiveness and reliability, while promoting AI science and innovation and leveraging AI for economic growth and social good.

A genuinely international open AI ecosystem could therefore provide developing countries with an additional technological pathway. However, there are concerns in some quarters that replacing one form of technological dependency with another could undermine this objective. Therefore, for an open AI initiative to remain genuinely inclusive, its participation must be broad, its governance transparent, intellectual property questions carefully addressed. Participating countries must retain meaningful autonomy over their own AI policies.

The principle of strategic autonomy is therefore important not only for India but also for the wider Global South. Openness should not simply mean access to technologies developed elsewhere; it should also mean the capacity to participate in their development, adaptation, governance and deployment.

From competition to technological co-development

India–China relations in recent years have been dominated by geopolitical disagreements and strategic competition. Yet international relations need not be reduced to either cooperation or confrontation. Selective cooperation in areas of common interest is possible even when significant differences remain elsewhere.

Climate change, public health, food security and sustainable development have already demonstrated that certain global challenges cannot be effectively addressed through purely national approaches. Artificial intelligence increasingly belongs in the same category. The transnational character of AI technologies, their enormous infrastructure requirements and their potential social and economic consequences make international cooperation increasingly relevant.

A collaborative India–China AI framework could focus initially on areas with clear developmental benefits: agriculture, healthcare, education, climate modeling, disaster management, multilingual translation, smart cities and small and medium-sized enterprises.

Such cooperation would also benefit other developing countries. Indian and Chinese researchers could jointly develop AI systems adapted to Asian and Global South conditions rather than simply importing technological models designed primarily for Western markets.

For example, multilingual AI represents an area in which the linguistic diversity of India and the scale of China’s technological ecosystem could create opportunities for research and application beyond conventional English-language models. Similarly, agricultural AI, healthcare applications and climate-related technologies could be designed around the specific socioeconomic and environmental conditions of developing economies.

Such an approach would not necessarily require India and China to establish comprehensive technological cooperation. Rather, it could begin with carefully selected areas in which interests converge and where the developmental benefits are sufficiently clear to justify collaboration.

The need for safeguards

Support for open AI cooperation should not imply that technological openness by itself is sufficient. Artificial intelligence carries significant risks involving misinformation, privacy, cybersecurity, intellectual property, labour displacement and autonomous military applications.

Consequently, an India–China initiative would require robust governance mechanisms. The BRICS New Delhi Declaration already emphasizes AI accessibility together with safety, security, inclusiveness and reliability, while supporting international cooperation on AI science and innovation. It also calls for addressing challenges associated with data security, misinformation, disinformation, deepfakes and other forms of technological misuse.

The objective should be an open, interoperable and pluralistic AI ecosystem, with clear safeguards for data protection, intellectual property, cybersecurity, transparency and human oversight.

Governance would be particularly important because technological openness can create different outcomes depending on institutional arrangements. An effective framework would therefore need clear rules concerning data, model access, intellectual property, research collaboration, cybersecurity and accountability. It would also need to recognize national sovereignty while encouraging sufficient interoperability to allow meaningful international cooperation.

The challenge is to establish an equilibrium between openness and security, technological cooperation and national interests, and innovation and responsible governance.

A potentially important opportunity

The BRICS AI open-source community proposal should consequently be understood as more than another Chinese technology initiative. Properly structured, it could become an experiment in creating a more decentralized global AI ecosystem. Xi’s proposal and the subsequent BRICS New Delhi Declaration provide a basis for examining whether such cooperation can move from political aspiration towards practical technological collaboration.

India and China are unlikely to resolve all their strategic differences through AI cooperation. Nor should AI cooperation be expected to transform the broader bilateral relationship. But neither should geopolitical disagreements prevent cooperation where common interests are identifiable.
The central question before China and India is whether they can use emerging technological opportunities to strengthen their own strategic interests while contributing to a more inclusive global AI order.

India’s technological capabilities, developmental experience and international standing could make it a particularly important partner in transforming the proposal from a Chinese initiative into a genuinely international platform. If Beijing provides technological scale and infrastructure while New Delhi contributes software capabilities, digital public infrastructure, experience with large-scale digital systems and a strong emphasis on inclusive development, China and India could potentially make a formidable team in building a more open AI ecosystem for the Global South.

The significance of such cooperation would ultimately depend not on political declarations alone, but on whether both countries can establish practical mechanisms for research collaboration, technology sharing, capacity building and responsible governance. If those conditions can be developed, open AI cooperation within BRICS could become an important test of whether technological globalization can be made more inclusive.

At a time when artificial intelligence is becoming an increasingly important determinant of economic competitiveness, technological sovereignty and international influence, the Global South cannot remain merely a consumer of technologies developed elsewhere. India and China have the scale, capabilities and developmental experience to contribute to an alternative model – one in which technological innovation is accompanied by broader access, international cooperation and greater participation by developing economies.

The proposed BRICS AI open-source community therefore presents an opportunity for India and China to explore whether strategic competition can coexist with selective technological cooperation. The outcome would have implications extending well beyond their bilateral relationship. It could help shape the emerging debate over who develops AI, who controls its infrastructure, who benefits from its applications and how the technological future of the Global South is constructed.

Oman
Source: www.omanobserver.om

The idea of a BRICS currency, as part of a de-dollarisation move, has drawn widespread attention since the Brazilian President mooted a common currency at the 2023 BRICS summit. The BRICS summit held in 2025 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, also emphasised the need for a common currency to reduce dependence on the US dollar in international trade, commerce, and cross-border payments.

The recently concluded New Delhi summit also underscored the importance but unanimously decided that moving away from the dollar will be a gradual process rather than an abrupt move away from the existing international monetary order.

The dollar’s dominance is not new. It remains the principal currency for global reserves, trade, finance and investment. Deep and liquid financial markets, large dollar-denominated assets, robust banking and payment networks, and the confidence of international investors have together created an ecosystem that is exceptionally difficult to replicate.

Countries use the dollar because their trading partners, banks and investors use it. Even transactions between countries with limited economic links to the United States are often invoiced and settled in dollars. This widespread use, in turn, strengthens the currency’s international role.

Yet there are growing reasons to diversify. The expanding use of financial sanctions by the US administration has prompted several countries to explore alternatives to the dollar-based financial system.

The recent US move to tighten sanctions on Russia and Iran has also added to concerns in countries like India with higher tariffs. The sanctions and punitive actions on countries are creating uncertainties and disruptions in global trade. Therefore, greater use of national currencies could help reduce exposure to the dollar dependence. Alternative payment mechanisms could also reduce dependence on Western financial infrastructure, including the SWIFT network.

A currency does not become an international transaction currency just because a country pushes it. It requires broad convertibility, deep and liquid financial markets, reliable settlement mechanisms, credible institutions and, above all, the confidence of global investors. Here comes the biggest hurdles for BRICS and its allies.

The members have different inflation rates, monetary policies, exchange rate regimes, capital controls, economic structures and fiscal priorities, besides their geopolitical interests.

China’s Renminbi (RMB) might appear to be an option for a larger international role, given the size of the Chinese economy and its larger role in global trade. However, replacing the dollar with another dominant currency would make no difference. It could simply shift dependence from one major currency to another.

Again, another issue is that global investors must be able to hold assets denominated in the ‘currency concerned’ over the long term, with confidence that those assets can be bought, sold and repatriated efficiently. The depth, openness and liquidity of financial markets therefore matter as much as the size of an economy.

The BRICS Delhi declaration appears to have recognised these constraints. The US dollar has dominated the international monetary system for decades because of the depth and liquidity of the US financial markets, the huge volume of dollar-denominated assets, and its widespread use in global trade and commodity pricing.

Recreating an ecosystem like this would take years. The BRICS New Delhi summit has understood this challenge clearly and advocated a more realistic approach to increase the use of local currencies where commercially viable, rather than attempt an immediate replacement of the dollar.

Greater settlement in national currencies, combined with the development and eventual interoperability of alternative payment systems, could gradually reshape the international payments landscape. India’s UPI, Brazil’s Pix, Russia’s SPFS and China’s CIPS represent different components of this emerging infrastructure. The New Development Bank (NDB), established by BRICS, could also play a larger role in financing infrastructure and development projects in emerging and developing economies, particularly if lending and settlement in local currencies expand.

De-dollarisation is likely to be a gradual and long-term process. Over time, BRICS could contribute to a more diversified international financial system, giving countries greater flexibility in how they conduct trade, settle payments and finance development.

The New Delhi summit message reflected a pragmatic approach, emphasising the interoperability of local-currency payment systems rather than outright de-dollarisation. The gradual expansion of local-currency settlements, alternative payment networks and new sources of development finance could, over time, reduce the global financial system’s dependence on a single currency. While de-dollarisation may remain a long-term possibility, the more tangible trend for now is toward greater monetary diversification.

Greece
Source: moderndiplomacy.eu

BRICS can't agree on a currency and the SCO can't agree where to put its bank. Beijing doesn't need them to. What it wants from the Global South is votes, markets and a story, and it will cash them in at the UN, the IMF and the WTO.

Stalling Clubs, Growing Caucus

In mid-September Xi Jinping made his first visit to India in seven years for the BRICS summit in New Delhi. The bloc’s declaration opposed “unilateral tariff and non-tariff measures” without naming the United States. It softened last year’s language on the Middle East and once again stopped short of a common currency. Two weeks earlier in Bishkek, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation amended its charter but left its long-promised development bank stuck in a quarrel between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan over which of them would host it. In the same weeks, Beijing said that about 160 countries and organisations now back its Global Governance Initiative, and that more than 60 have joined a “Group of Friends” meeting in New York, Geneva and Vienna, the UN’s three main seats. The clubs China helped build are stalling, while the caucus it is building inside the UN keeps growing. That contrast is the clearest answer yet to what Beijing wants.

Four Initiatives and a Retreating America

Xi launched the Global Governance Initiative on 1 September 2025 at the SCO summit in Tianjin, timed to the UN’s 80th anniversary. Its five principles — sovereign equality, international rule of law, “true” multilateralism, a people-centred approach and a focus on results — complete a set with Beijing’s earlier development, security and civilisation initiatives. Steve Tsang of SOAS calls this the Global South half of Xi’s “double pivot”. BRICS, meanwhile, has grown to 11 members and ten partner countries.

Two shifts changed the backdrop. The first is American retreat: in January Washington announced it would leave 66 international organisations. The second is China repositioning itself inside existing bodies. In September 2025 Premier Li Qiang said China would no longer seek special and differential treatment, the softer WTO rules reserved for developing countries, in future agreements, while keeping its developing-country status. And since 1 May 2026, goods from 53 African countries have entered China tariff-free.

Recruit Outside, Win Inside

The debate is usually framed as a choice: is China building a rival order, or reforming the existing one from within? The evidence of the past year points clearly to the second. Beijing is not trying to replace the UN, the IMF or the WTO. It is trying to win a durable majority inside them, and it uses BRICS and the SCO to recruit that majority, not to house it.

Look at where the effort goes. The Group of Friends meets in UN cities, not in Shanghai. China’s nine stated reform priorities lead with strengthening the UN and the authority of the Security Council, and Beijing has made more African representation on the Council an explicit goal. The one new international body it has created, the International Organization for Mediation in Hong Kong, is a mediation service that sits alongside existing courts and tribunals rather than competing with them. At this year’s WTO ministerial in Yaoundé, which collapsed over the rules for developing countries, it was Washington that attacked the system’s foundations and Beijing that defended “true multilateralism”.

The reason is simple: the existing institutions hold the prize. At the IMF, China’s actual quota share is 6.39%, less than half the 13.7% that the Fund’s own formula says its economy justifies. The US share of 17.4% preserves Washington’s veto over decisions that need 85% support. A parallel fund cannot break that veto or confer that legitimacy. Only votes inside the IMF can. Trade tells the same story.

China ran a record $1.2 trillion trade surplus in 2025 on exports of $3.77 trillion. A country that sells that much abroad needs open markets under predictable rules, not a world broken into rival blocs.
The weakness of BRICS and the SCO is therefore not a failure of Chinese strategy. It is evidence of what the strategy is. If Beijing wanted an alternative order, a bloc that cannot agree on a currency and a security organisation that cannot site a bank would be the flimsiest possible foundations, especially with India inside both, ready to slow anything that looks like a Chinese project. As recruiting grounds and test beds — for local-currency lending through the New Development Bank, or for links between national payment systems — they work well enough.

So what does Beijing want from the Global South? Votes, markets and a story. It wants votes to reweight the IMF, to defend developing-country rules at the WTO and to win Security Council seats for African states that would rarely vote against China. It wants markets to absorb the exports America no longer takes. And it wants a story in which China, not the US, is the defender of the UN Charter. The Africa zero-tariff scheme shows how cheaply some of this can be bought: the continent already runs a large trade deficit with China, so the gesture costs Beijing little and earns it a great deal. Giving up new WTO concessions while keeping developing-country status is the mirror image. It removes an American talking point without leaving the Global South club.

The strongest objection is that “reform from within” is cover. China has also built its own cross-border payments network, a digital currency, lenders such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and now a mediation body it hosts. On this view, these are the skeleton of an exit. Part of that is right: Beijing is building plumbing that would survive Western sanctions. But plumbing built to survive sanctions is insurance, not a destination. The bigger threat to China’s strategy is its own export machine. In January Mexico imposed tariffs of up to 50% on 1,463 product lines from countries without a trade deal with it, China first among them. The surplus that pays for the courtship is also what is alienating the countries being courted.

Three Paths for Beijing’s Majority

Base case: incremental capture (about 55%). The Group of Friends keeps growing, Chinese candidates win more posts in UN agencies, and Beijing leads the push to rewrite the IMF quota formula. BRICS and the SCO stay modest. The key assumption is that the US stays disengaged and that Global South trade friction with China remains limited to sectors such as steel and cars. For Western governments and companies, Chinese influence will show up first in standard-setting fights inside UN technical agencies on AI, data and telecoms, long before it shows up in any new bloc.

Downside for Beijing: a Global South trade backlash (about 25%). Chinese goods diverted from the US flood a second wave of markets, and Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa or India follow Mexico with broad tariff increases rather than case-by-case anti-dumping duties. Votes become transactional, and BRICS splits along trade lines, with India leading a camp that treats China as a competitor first. The clearest early signal would be a large developing economy filing a WTO case against Chinese industrial subsidies.

Alternative: reform by inheritance (about 20%). If Washington’s retreat deepens, through further cuts to the UN’s regular budget or a walk-away from what remains of WTO dispute settlement, China becomes the main sponsor of a weakened existing system rather than its reformer. That would hand Beijing the order without having to rebuild it, but also its bills: development finance, peacekeeping and crisis lending that China has so far preferred to provide on its own terms.

Watch Bangkok, Not Bishkek

China is not building a new world order. It is assembling a majority in the old one, and BRICS and the SCO are where it recruits, not where it rules. What it wants from the Global South is a constituency. Its weak point is that this constituency is also its export market of last resort.

The thing to watch is the IMF and World Bank Annual Meetings in Bangkok, which run from 12 to 18 October. If BRICS finance ministers hold a common line on IMF quota realignment there, with China leading it, the strategy is working. If India and Brazil hedge, the majority Beijing is counting on is thinner than its 160-country tally suggests. Beijing does not need a new world order. It needs a recount in the old one.

Russia
Source: valdaiclub.com

B.Sharma: Thank you very much, Mr President. My question is about BRICS. There was a very positive and Global South-centric declaration in Delhi; a number of mechanisms have also been formulated. But the main countries of BRICS have different ecosystems and perhaps a slightly different outlook.

One of the intentions that was stated was to realign the positions of different countries. So, is this going to be a yearly ritual at the top leadership level, or are you going to do a little more – to give a little more push to this great initiative?

Vladimir Putin: As I have said many times, BRICS was born in Russia. It began as a meeting of the leaders of Russia, India, and China – known as RIC – and was later joined by Brazil, South Africa, and the other countries that are members today. I have just said from the podium here that a group like BRICS can indeed be as a prototype for the future global order.

We can see that today it represents almost half of the world’s population, and BRICS’s share of the global economy is constantly increasing. This happens year after year; we can see it, and the statistics confirm it. So indeed, the most important thing is the principles underpinning the formation and functioning of BRICS, with all members being equal and no one dominating. That is what makes it appealing. However, it does not have the feature that the UN Security Council possesses: binding decisions. For the United Nations, this is generally an effective instrument and mechanism.

It is difficult to say today how BRICS will evolve within the new architecture of international relations, but it is absolutely clear that it is a useful instrument and mechanism, given the principles I have just mentioned.

Yet BRICS is not just about formal meetings between national leaders. Modern financial mechanisms are also being developed within its framework. When business representatives meet, they can find very interesting, important and promising joint projects. There is also humanitarian cooperation across various arts, which is crucial because it brings people closer together.

For instance, we proposed establishing a new investment platform within BRICS. This platform would not only help develop the economies of member states but could also operate effectively in other countries – those with rapidly growing populations and developing economies that are striving to raise their people’s living standards to global levels. This holds great promise, particularly considering the ongoing urbanisation process in these countries. Modern settlement systems capable of processing transactions between BRICS countries and their companies independently of external interference could be highly valuable and offer significant potential.

Step by step, gradually, brick by brick, all of this is helping to build a new architecture. Progress will continue in this gradual manner. There is no point in getting ahead of ourselves; it could even be dangerous. We need to address issues and challenges as they arise.

Saudi Arabia
Source: www.arabnews.com

MOSCOW: Panelists at the BRICS+ Fashion Summit in Moscow staged a wide-ranging conversation over artificial intelligence this week.

Under the title “Artificial Intelligence in the Creative Process: Tool or Co-Author?,” designers, cultural advocates and legal specialists from across the BRICS+ region and beyond came together to interrogate how generative AI is reshaping fashion, craft and the laws that govern creative work. What began as a conversation about workflow and inspiration turned to provenance, cultural protection and the gap between technical capability and legal frameworks.

New Delhi-based designer Kanika Goyal set the ethical tone, stressing human responsibility in decisions about AI-assisted work. “At the end of the day, it’s your call,” she said, arguing that the creative person must decide “whether to reject the idea, to accept it, to edit, or to improvise.” If a creator simply accepted “the first choice that AI generates without even questioning it, then definitely the authorship has been passed on.”

She compared AI to existing tools, saying: “If a camera is taking a photo, if Photoshop helps you to edit, if a sewing machine is helping you stitch, you do not give them that authorship for what they have not created.” The difference, she said, is intention: “Authorship lies with you. You are the one who needs to take that decision.”

A representative from the Seychelles framed AI as both lifeline and risk: “AI is definitely helping our young generation designers to design and communicate to a wider audience,” said Tery Carolo, CEO of Seychelles Fashion Week, while emphasizing that the community must document its work to preserve Creole heritage. “So, the process is very important for us,” he added, describing initiatives that required designers to show research, color choices and iterative steps when AI was part of a workflow.

He illustrated the approach with an example; a family painting decades old was digitized and printed on contemporary swimwear — “the original painting is being transformed onto the fabric” — a project that combined manual craft, Photoshop and selective AI use while keeping provenance visible.

Legal and IP concerns came up multiple times through the session.

Daria Voinova, CEO of IPEX, a prominent Russian digital marketplace and platform dedicated to managing and trading intellectual property, warned that models trained on massive datasets could reproduce identifiable artisanal styles, raising questions about who owned the output and whether it could be registered as intellectual property.

The panelists did not reach legal consensus, but they did agree on some practical prescriptions; document prompts and steps, establish provenance records, and build industry norms to avoid costly disputes. As Voinova put it in discussing practical safeguards, precision matters; more specific prompts and clearer documentation produces results that are closer to what creators intend.

Another recurring worry was cultural dilution. Several participants cautioned that broad, uncurated training data risked flattening local aesthetics and erasing cultural specifities. That, they argued, would be particularly damaging to crafts rooted in place specific knowledge and ritual.

If the opening panel delivered a clear message it was this; AI is neither a savior nor an inevitable usurper. It is a contested technology that requires new norms, education and protective infrastructures. And until legal and ethical frameworks catch up, the final act of authorship remains human.

Russia
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org

Among the infrastructural trends of the past several years, one of the most actively discussed has been creation of bi-oceanic corridors across the main regions of the Global South. And while the benefits from the launching of a system of bi-oceanic corridors would arguably accrue to the entire global economy via reducing the dependency on a limited array of chokepoints, some countries stand to derive benefits that are particularly palpable. This concerns the largest emerging markets, most notably the BRICs economies, that are separated from neighboring oceanic coastlines by distances of 500-1000 km*. In effect, across the world’s heavyweights, the largest BRICS economies are in unique position to become the main beneficiaries of gaining access to the network of bi-oceanic corridors and boosting their bi-oceanic connectivity capabilities (the largest developing economies such as China and India have gateways only to one ocean – Pacific and Indian ocean respectively; same for Brazil with respect to the Atlantic). In particular, the respective distances (shortest distance taken) for BRICs to their respective oceanic coastlines are the following[1]:

• Brazil to Pacific coast: around 500-600 km (via Peru)
• India to Pacific coast: less than 950 km (alternative measures at less than 800 km) (via Thailand)
• China to Indian ocean coast: around 500 km (via Myanmar)
• Russia to Indian ocean coast: around 1700 km (via Iran/Azerbaijan)

In the above list of BRICs distance gaps to attain bi-oceanic capability, the Eurasian segment, in particular that of the RICs economies (Russia, India, China), presents particularly sizeable challenges. In Russia’s case, the key bi-oceanic gateway to the Indian ocean is the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a multimodal transport network of ship, rail, and road routes connecting St. Petersburg in Russia to Mumbai in India via Iran and the Caspian Sea. The network consists of three branches – the Western Branch connects Russia and Iran via Azerbaijan; the Eastern Branch connects Russia and Iran through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan; the Trans-Caspian Branch connects the ports of Russia and Iran via the Caspian basin.

China’s bi-oceanic gateway into the Indian ocean relies on the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) as well as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The latter connects Kashgar in China’s western Xinjiang region to Gwadar Port on the Arabian Sea (northern Indian Ocean) via a network of highways, railways, and pipelines. The CMEC corridor connects southwest China’s Kunming (Yunnan region) to the Bay of Bengal via Mandalay, Yangon and Kyaukpyu in Myanmar.
India’s connectivity to the Pacific is routed via the Mekong-India Economic Corridor (MIEC) which runs from Chennai to Dawei in Myanmar (maritime segment) and then to Bangkok and Phnom Penh to Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam. Another bi-oceanic route is the India–Myanmar–Thailand (IMT) Trilateral Highway that connects Moreh in Northeast India via Myanmar to Thailand – existing regional agreements envisage this corridor to be extended into the Pacific to reach Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.

The above network of bi-oceanic corridors in Eurasia spearheaded by RICs economies has the potential to drastically improve connectivity throughout the continent, particularly for the landlocked Central Asian economies. What is needed to derive the synergy from such a logistical network is to co-integrate its main arteries – something that has been advocated by Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev[2]. Eurasia’s regional development institutions such as the Eurasian Development Bank together with the rising number of peer development banks could form a co-financing platform to support this massive infrastructural effort.

Bringing together the main bi-oceanic corridors of RICs economies may with time give rise to what may be termed as the RICs Ring Road (RRR) that is supported by other parts of Eurasia’s connectivity network, including the BRI. The INSTC would form the Western contour of the co-integrated RRR, India’s and China’s projects would form the southern and eastern branches, with the BRI and other Russia-China transportation lines forming the northern contours of the logistical framework. While such a co-integration effort may prove costly in terms of capital outlays, particularly given the differences in infrastructural standards and structures (including railway gauge), the longer-term benefits of boosting economic cooperation across Eurasia’s largest economies and addressing the needs of Eurasia’s Hinterland regions would be crucial for the success of SCO+ and EAEU integration efforts.

Table 1: Segments of the RICs Ring Road (RRR) in Eurasia




Source: author’s compilations, assisted in table generation by Google AI

The bi-oceanic connection is particularly critical for China and India – in the case of China, access into the Indian ocean improves the country’s accessibility to the GCC markets that are also crucial sources of energy supplies; for India accessibility into the Pacific basin will expand the possibilities of trade with ASEAN – one of the fastest growing parts of the world economy. Furthermore, rather than two separate bi-oceanic projects being developed by China and India, there could be a case for building a joint bi-oceanic project connecting China to the Indian ocean and India to the Pacific – such a connectivity track could potentially become one of the strongest linkages between the two largest economies of the Global South. Such a crucial gateway to building China-India economic ties could be driven by de novo logistical arteries and projects or the resuscitation of past projects such as the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor running from Kolkata, India via Bangladesh and Myanmar to Kunming, China.

Overall, while the RRR project holds a wealth of promise, it is also susceptible to significant risks associated with high financing requirements (to be addressed via syndicated regionalism and co-financing by regional development banks) as well as geopolitical/security risks in the region. Nevertheless, the RRR system of inter-connected bi-oceanic corridors among the RICs economies addresses some of the fundamental connectivity needs in Eurasia, including via building stronger linkages among the largest economies of the continent as well as providing higher optionality in the access to coastal areas for the landlocked regions in Central Asia and South Asia. The uniqueness of the logistical challenges faced by BRICs countries in building their bi-oceanic capabilities if addressed through coordinated infrastructural efforts could deliver sizable multiplier effects to intra-BRICS and South-South economic cooperation. The Eurasian part of this effort could be then connected with other bi-oceanic networks of the Global South in Africa and Latin America, with the latter, in particular Brazil, already exploring the possibility of connecting regional bi-oceanic routes with China’s ports. The result of such cross-continental co-integration of bi-oceanic projects across the main regions of the Global South would be a global connectivity network that creates back-up options for the world economy and reduces its dependency on the traditional congested routes.

[1] Approximate distances as gauged via https://antipode.com/
*Russia is the only economy within BRICs that is tri-oceanic, but it also faces significantly higher separation of nearly 1700 km to the Indian ocean compared to the distances faced by the rest of the group.
[2] https://kz.kursiv.media/2026-09-13/brics-yaroslav-lissovolik/

Yaroslav Lissovolik, Founder, BRICS+ Analytics

Russia
Source: valdaiclub.com

The BRICS countries need peace and development. Historically, they have operated within global institutions shaped by the developed countries. Now they have no choice but to raise the question of institutions that actually work for their development—and in the interests of all humanity. And they have much to offer the world when it comes to preserving global geopolitical stability, writes Leonid Grigoryev, Academic Supervisor of the School of World Economy at HSE University. The article was prepared specially for the 23rd Annual Meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club.

The global economy is still growing, but the traditional unevenness of development is turning, before our eyes, into stark contrasts. The “Titanic” of the world economy is vast and, though holed in several places, stays afloat. True, just as in the original case, the lookouts in the bow are peering into the fog without binoculars (a historical fact), while the captains trust to luck that they will dodge the iceberg. This year, 2026, forecasts (the International Monetary Fund’s July forecast in particular) have promised a slowdown in global GDP growth to 3 per cent (from 3.5 per cent last year). The main players are adapting to the tariff conflicts between the US and the EU, but the side effects are reorganisation and secondary conflicts (Canada, Ireland). And once again emerges the threat of the “de-Great-Britainisation” of the British Isles for economic reasons.

The post-Covid economic recovery is far from smooth, and it is also running into geopolitical shocks. An obvious (though not everlasting) driver has been investment in data centres in the US and a number of other countries, which has given a boost to exports from the makers of AI hardware in South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thailand. China, India, and the US continue to grow thanks to their own domestic factors. The US still enjoys an inflow of migrants and financial resources from around the world, which allows it to import an excess trillion dollars’ worth of goods (in trade balance terms) while at the same time complaining about deindustrialisation.

By mid-2026, global inflation had picked up, partly as a result of a sharp rise in energy prices. At the same time, yields on long-term government bonds are rising dangerously in the US (already 5 per cent) and in other leading developed economies. Public debts are large enough as it is, and now the relatively cheap bonds within them are being replaced by costlier ones. This is largely down to an attempt by the finance ministries of the leading countries to pull some of the long-term bonds (from the huge debts of, say, the US and France) out of the central banks and put them on the open market. Now the central banks are beginning to raise their key interest rates step by step in a gruelling fight against inflation, and that is already dragging things towards stagnation. Rising military spending against this backdrop is becoming a factor that exacerbates social problems. We shall wait for the IMF’s October forecast and its assessment of how the sizeable rise in prices and the disruption to supply chains will affect growth in 2026–2027.

Before our eyes, an entire region—the Middle East—has slid into negative growth owing to a fall in the output and export of energy resources. The rise in prices and profits (and in dividends and share prices) has gone to American energy companies. The Middle East, the developed countries’ traditional supplier, is suffering heavy losses, both in current income and in damaged physical infrastructure. The rise in oil prices and the diesel shortage mean losses not only for industrial companies, transport, and the housing sector. They also create an atmosphere of uncertainty when it comes to capital accumulation—and humanity’s happiness cannot be built on data centres alone.
In this global situation, there is no hope of help from the world’s second most powerful economic bloc, with its seven hundred million consumers—the European Union plus the United Kingdom. In practice, its GDP is growing at a rate comparable to population growth. Government debts, budget deficits, ageing industry and infrastructure, a population that not even migrants have managed to rejuvenate quickly. Financial resources are flowing to the US, industry is ceding ground to China’s, and politically almost every country is fragmented. Energy is markedly more expensive than in the US, productivity is far lower than in China, and voter sentiment, judging by the elections, is noticeably gloomier than it ought to be in this happy corner of civilisation. Now the climate, too, has turned too hot, without waiting for the green programmes to be delivered.

Many people are aware of the risks of ever-spiralling sanctions, but see them merely as a complication of day-to-day business. The trouble is that there is no way out of the multilayered tangle of legal, commercial, and political interests and of the decisions of disparate legislative and administrative bodies. Or there is only “Solon’s method”—wipe the slate clean all at once! Meanwhile, sanctions, the destruction of transport and extraction capacity, and the loss of consumers (all of which can be added up) act like global tsunamis. They sweep across the earth’s oceans and return with redoubled force to their sources—striking the very initiators of the tsunami as well. As Clausewitz would have put it, sanctions are the continuation of war by other means. The hardest and most undeserved blows fall on countries and social strata that have no part in these processes and no wish to take part in them. Having stumbled over sanctions like this, one cannot help wishing for less globalisation and interdependence in the world, since, according to cybernetic theory, instability among the elements of large systems makes it harder for them to return to equilibrium.

The risk of a downturn hangs, as ever, on the build-up of the “powder-keg potential” of imbalances and on a possible trigger, unpredictable in principle. The latter is an event that causes a sharp deterioration in business activity (akin to Covid), a financial crisis, a stock market shock, or a major bankruptcy (as in 2008). Imbalances are plainly accumulating—specialists have started debating it. And there is already a certain group of economic agents and problems that are falling victim to geopolitical conflicts, to slowing growth, and to the diversion of resources into making up for losses instead of into development.

Among them are global problems: poverty, narrowing the gaps in levels of development, and climate questions. The UN Sustainable Development Goals for 2030 will probably be 17 per cent fulfilled. On many key issues, work worldwide has barely begun. It is clearly time to think about a new world project, but that requires peace, compromise, coordination, stability, and trust. All of these are in short supply, beginning with the last.

And here the world finds itself in a new situation, in which international institutions are of little effect and the leading developed countries are busy with their own problems and with sanctions. The question arises of the fate of the world community, of catch-up development, of poverty, of solving global problems—who, exactly, is going to take on the common tasks? In virtually every country there are sizeable sections of society facing one problem or another: in health care, in inequality of education and of social status, and so on.

This will fall on the shoulders of the large developing countries, whose interests by and large align with global objectives (and certainly do not conflict with them)—the BRICS group and a number of countries with similar aims. Their resources for tackling these problems are smaller than those of the developed countries, but the need to act compels them to organise. The recent recent Declaration of the BRICS summit (a group whose members have difficulties in their relations with one another) stands as a voice of reason in an era uncomfortably reminiscent of the “Thucydides Trap.” Differences in political systems and in prosperity, frictions—and yet problems are to be solved through strengthening the UN and reforming the IMF, that is, through compromise, all the more so as there are no simple, radical solutions. The Declaration acknowledges (paragraph 49) that “current global challenges are complex and interlinked and impede economic growth and sustainable development of countries while accentuating persistent development gaps across countries and regions.”
The Declaration speaks of industrial and energy policy suited to the task of moving on from the fourth stage of the industrial revolution. The BRICS countries’ infrastructure tasks have not yet been fully resolved. Manufacturing, railways, innovation, and access to technology must all be developed, along with the transition to home-grown technologies. Emphasis must be placed on developing human capital and resolving social problems. Naturally, this calls for the defence of free trade, free markets, freedom of movement, and the security of global finance and savings. BRICS has its own position on the global governance of artificial intelligence—and that is already a look into the future.
The Declaration supports sustainable development, although its substance, pace, and forms of implementation call for in-depth analysis. The BRICS countries need peace and development. Historically, they have operated within global institutions shaped by the developed countries. Now they have no choice but to raise the question of institutions that actually work for their development—and in the interests of all humanity. And they have much to offer the world when it comes to preserving global geopolitical stability: “On the landmark occasion of the 20th anniversary of BRICS, we reiterate our commitment to reforming and improving global governance by promoting a more just, equitable, agile, effective, efficient, responsive, representative, legitimate, democratic and accountable international and multilateral system in the spirit of extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits.” Time-honoured, correct declarations are becoming a practical agenda. Naturally, this presupposes respect for the cultural identities of the world’s peoples. It is a matter of inclusive global governance and the strengthening of multilateralism. That is, of restoring trust in the world.

Russia
Source: russiancouncil.ru

India’s Eurasian diplomacy was on full display recently, as New Delhi participated in the 26^th Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Bishkek and hosted the 18^th BRICS summit in New Delhi. Both forums bring India into close multilateral engagement with Russia and China, even as New Delhi continues to deepen its ties with Western powers through similar mechanisms like Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, G7 Outreach, India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor, and the I2U2 (India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States). Given the ongoing alignment between Russia and China, due to their strategic competition with the West, India’s multilateral strategy could appear somewhat contradictory. However, this signifies the overall multi-alignment doctrine of India’s foreign policy, where New Delhi engages all major centers of power to increase its space to maneuver the great power competition and safeguard its strategic autonomy.

India’s former foreign secretary, Shyam Saran has defined strategic autonomy in the following way: “It is best understood as the capacity of a state to take relatively autonomous decisions on matters of vital interest to the state. The element of relativity is important. Not all interests are of a vital nature, and in a multi-state landscape, one cannot ascribe absolute value to every interest. If one did so, there would be no space for diplomacy. On different issues, in different time periods and situations, the calculus will differ.”

In the context of Saran’s definition, India’s vital interests in Eurasia (connectivity, counter-terrorism, regional stability and monitoring China-Pakistan ties) make SCO membership important for New Delhi. On the other hand, BRICS serves India’s global and economic interests like reform of global governance institutions, local currency trade, developing alternatives to Western financial institutions and being a prominent voice of the Global South. For this reason, India’s presence in forums where China and Russia are present does not work against its ties with the West, as relativity is important in such a context. India will cooperate with China and Russia but at the same time, New Delhi will also find ways to balance China through initiatives like Quad, largely due to lack of strategic trust between the two Asian powers. Indian experts have termed it as “evasive balancing,” which is a combination of balancing and reassurance towards China.

SCO and BRICS, hence, become spaces for diplomacy to engage with China. If India boycotts these forums, it cedes important diplomatic space to China in Eurasia and the Global South. This will impact India’s strategic autonomy in a negative way. Afterall, since India’s independence, its policy towards multilateralism has aimed to ensure its strategic autonomy. During the Cold War, India emphasized centrality of the United Nations in global affairs which was an attempt to stay away from the military alliances and the great power competition between the U.S. and the then Soviet Union. India also played an important role in establishment of multilateral platforms other than the UN, like the Non-Alignment Movement and the G-77 Group. These initiatives carried a collective identity of the “Third World” and gave voice to its member states on issues like decolonization, sovereignty, universal disarmament and a New International Economic Order (NIEO).

In the 1990s, with the end of the bipolar era, India diversified its multilateral policy by joining newly formed other institutions. It became a founding member of World Trade Organization (WTO) and G20, joined ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and played an important role in establishing regional forums like Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). These mechanisms strengthened India’s strategic autonomy in different ways. The WTO allowed India to engage with the emerging global economic order, the G20 gave New Delhi a voice in global financial governance while ARF, BIMSTEC and IORA strengthened India’s regional and diplomatic network in South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean.

Rise of BRICS and the SCO in India’s Foreign Policy

BRICS was an outcome of the RIC (Russia, India, China) process that started at the level of foreign ministers in September 2002. India had already signed a nuclear deal with the U.S. before the first 2009 BRIC summit took place in Russia. In India’s domestic politics, there were concerns expressed by opposition parties that India would lose its strategic autonomy after signing the nuclear deal with the U.S. However, the Indian government had to clarify that India would continue to uphold its strategic autonomy. This is further bolstered by the fact that India become a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2017.

Interestingly, in the same year, India was part of the leaders meeting of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) which aimed to revive this mechanism for maritime security. In some ways, it was an attempt by India to engage simultaneously with the Eurasian and Indo-Pacific initiatives while keeping its own interests at the center. The seemingly simultaneous rise of BRICS, SCO and Quad in India’s foreign policy are indicative of its multi-alignment strategy, in which New Delhi engages the great powers, carefully navigates their complex relationships to strengthen its strategic autonomy.

With this, the SCO remains one of the main regional organizations in Eurasia which becomes important for India, as its physical access to the region remains constrained by geography, particularly due to absence of direct overland connectivity. Afterall, the SCO has become a mechanism through which there are regular political interactions between India and Central Asian countries. India has bilateral channels of regular interactions with Russia and SCO further adds to that momentum, as both Russia and the Central Asian countries supported India’s SCO membership. Additionally, the SCO also facilitates India-China engagement, although their overall relationship remains devoid of any strategic trust. For this reason, India maintains a constant contact with the Eurasian region through the SCO, in its efforts to shape a multipolar Eurasia; one which is not dominated by a single power. SCO membership also prevents India’s diplomatic isolation in a region where its geographical connectivity is limited. However, the presence of both China and Pakistan in the SCO may complicate some of India’s interests, particularly in areas like anti-terrorism.

On the other hand, BRICS provides a bigger platform for India's engagement with the world. BRICS supports India’s long-standing demand to reform the global governance institutions like the World Bank, International Monetary Funds and the UN Security Council. If India becomes a permanent UNSC member, that will enhance India’s capability to protect its strategic autonomy. In addition, the New Development Bank (NDB) widens India’s choice to seek developmental assistance beyond Western institutions. The NDB has approved approximately USD 10 billion for 28 major infrastructure projects in India, including metro projects and the Delhi–Ghaziabad–Meerut Regional Rapid Transit System.

Furthermore, BRICS also allows India to keep the Global South agenda at the center of the global development debate. Trade in local currencies and interlinking their existing national payment systems helps BRICS countries to develop options beyond Western payment mechanisms. This will help India to deal with external geopolitical pressure, sanctions and tariffs, strengthening its economic autonomy.

The 2026 BRICS New Delhi Declaration notably highlighted the technology dimension to strategic autonomy. Cooperation among BRICS countries over artificial intelligence (AI) governance and emerging technologies gives India alternative platforms in shaping technology norms instead of depending on such frameworks developed by any one country. The BRICS Leaders’ Statement on the Global Governance of AI, issued in 2025 at Rio de Janerio, says that AI “must operate under national regulatory frameworks and the UN Charter, respect sovereignty as well as be representative, development-oriented, accessible, inclusive, dynamic, responsive, grounded in personal data protection, the rights and interests of humanity, safety, transparency, sustainability, and conducive to overcoming the growing digital and data divides, within and between countries.” Compared to the SCO, India is better placed in BRICS to safeguard its strategic autonomy as power is more diffused within the BRICS unlike the SCO where China’s influence is more pronounced due to lack of substantial members to balance Beijing. Hence, BRICS facilitates better flexibility and strategic autonomy for India.

Conclusion

India uses multilateralism to engage with competing power centers without having an alliance with them. Different multilateral institutions serve different aspects of strategic autonomy for India. SCO helps India’s institutional engagement with Central Asia, however, some complications or disagreement over terrorism and connectivity with China and Pakistan show some of the limits of India’s multi-alignment strategy. On the other hand, BRICS has a bigger vision and space for India to practice its strategic autonomy. Through initiatives like the NDB, local currency trade and alternative payment mechanisms, BRICS strengthens India’s economic autonomy in times of great power competition. In both the organizations, Russia is the bridge for India’s Eurasian and global ambitions. In other words, institutional diversification helps India to expand its strategic choices and hence, both SCO and BRICS will continue to play a role in shaping India’s strategic autonomy.

Russia
Source: russiancouncil.ru

On 30 September 2026, the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), together with the Center for Knowledge Diplomacy and the journal Diálogos do Sul Global, held a roundtable titled "Brazil's Choice — 2026: Scenarios of Impact on Russia-Brazil Relations".

Opening remarks were given by Ivan Kryazhev, Deputy Director for International Relations at the Centre for Knowledge Diplomacy; Alexandra Terzi, Program Coordinator at RIAC; and Vanessa Martina-Silva, Editor-in-Chief of Diálogos do Sul Global.

The expert discussion brought together Feliciano de Sá Guimarães, Associate Professor at the Institute of International Relations at the University of São Paulo and Editor-in-Chief of CEBRI-Journal; Leonardo Attuch, President of the Instituto Sul Global and founder of Brasil 247; Varvara Kuznetsova, Research Fellow at the Institute of Latin America of the Russian Academy of Sciences; Ana Lívia Araújo Esteves, Lecturer at the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at HSE University; Daniela Vieira Secches, Coordinator and Co-founder of the Observatório Rússia-América Latina (Ruslat) and Professor at the Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais (PUC Minas); Gustavo Pessoa, Professor of Economics at the Getulio Vargas Foundation; Vanessa Martina-Silva, Editor-in-Chief of Diálogos do Sul Global; and Alexandra Terzi, Program Coordinator at RIAC. The discussion was moderated by Ivan Kryazhev, Deputy Director for International Relations at the Center for Knowledge Diplomacy.

The experts discussed the current dynamics of Brazil's presidential campaign and how uncertain its outcome remains, the role of Parliament in the country's political landscape, what previous governments' experience can tell us about the future course, the inertia of Brazilian foreign policy and its ability to stay multi-vector if the political leadership changes, the risks facing BRICS as foreign policy priorities shift, and the structural and situational factors shaping Russia-Brazil relations.


Teses da mesa-redonda "A Escolha Brasileira — 2026: cenários de impacto nas relações Rússia-Brasil"

Key points

Feliciano de Sá Guimarães
Foreign policy in Brazil is no longer a niche topic and increasingly shapes how people vote. Over the past decade, more deputies and senators have been elected on platforms with an international agenda, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Defense is now one of the most contested in Congress. This means a candidate's stance on the US, Russia, Ukraine and Venezuela can directly pull voters closer or push them away.

Research from the University of São Paulo (USP) shows that approval or disapproval of the president is most closely tied to four international issues: Venezuela, the Israel–Palestine conflict, the war in Ukraine, and Brazil's relations with the Trump administration — the last being the most important. On three of the four, Lula is far from the median voter; he is closest on sovereignty and resistance to US pressure. Flávio, by contrast, is closer to the median voter on several of these issues, especially Venezuela and a hard line on organized crime.

If Lula is re-elected, the course towards Russia stays the same: there may be personnel changes at Itamaraty (C. Amorim, M. Vieira), but no abrupt shifts. The only new factor is the Mercosur–EU agreement, which could nudge Brazil slightly closer to European positions, above all on Ukraine. If Flávio wins, the picture is different: his foreign policy team is not yet formed, and within Bolsonarism two groups are competing — the "ideological" one, now weakened, and the "pragmatic" one. The latter's 22-page program text in Gazeta do Povo could have been written by any right-wing politician, not just a Bolsonarist. That points to a tactical goal — winning voters, calming the market and Washington — rather than an ideological shift.

The bilateral relationship can be split into structural and volatile elements. The structural one is Brazil's dependence on Russian fertilizers: the Achilles' heel of its agricultural economy. Any government will try to reduce it, but none will break off relations. The volatile element is the role of BRICS and the position on Ukraine. Flávio and his team signal a possible exit from BRICS or a minimized role, as under Jair, but that is risky given the consequences for relations with China.

Leonardo Attuch

Under Lula, Brazil–Russia relations will keep developing. Recent signals include Patrushev's visit to Brazil, Celso Amorim's trip to Russia, and discussions on defense and fertilizers. There is no reason to expect a deterioration in bilateral cooperation, since the trade agreement with the EU does not oblige Brazil to follow European positions on the war in Ukraine. Brasília has always stood against wars and has pushed to unite supporters of peaceful development. What is more, the belligerent line in Europe itself is running out of steam, weakening centrist governments and strengthening the far right.

In a hypothetical Flávio government, foreign policy would in practice be run by Marco Rubio, which would mean distancing from BRICS but not leaving it. Brazil cannot walk away from the bloc: China is its largest trading partner, the US runs a trade deficit, and the country is betting on ties with India and Russia. Jair did not pull Brazil out of BRICS, and Flávio would not either. What would change is the tone, not the direction: bilateral relations rest on a structural foundation that resists a change of government.

Brazil's election is part of a broader regional story. A Lula victory would act as a counterweight to Trump in the Western Hemisphere and would encourage political change in Argentina, where Milei is struggling to secure re-election. Under Flávio, the agenda would be set by the "Shield of the Americas" line: criminalizing the poor and those on the periphery, and an extremely negative scenario for South American integration.

Varvara Kuznetsova

With just days to go before the election, any forecast risks turning into speculation. The idea is to read the main candidates' programs like a "book of divination", through the eyes of the median Brazilian voter. That means focusing on what voters pick up quickly: images, visual style, strong ideological concepts and key slogans.

In 2022, the programs were predictable: Lula's ran to 21 pages, with a single image and criticism of the previous government; Jair Bolsonaro's ran to 48 pages, a heavy, dense text focused on the economy and on justifying the pandemic response. In 2026, the programs have become more elaborate and read like two films of different genres: Lula's is a large-scale biopic, 84 pages long, with the aesthetics of a great personality; Flávio's is a mix of "City of God" and "Elite Squad" — austere visually and centered on security.

Lula's program is built around strong ideological concepts, with "sovereignty" as the central word, mentioned on 21 of its 84 pages; then come "diversity", "justice" and "democracy". It is a text that, for the first time in the Brazilian left tradition, asserts racial policy so explicitly. Flávio's program, by contrast, avoids words like "nation" and "people", using "Brazilian" at the individual level. Its strongest concept is "cidadão de bem" ("upstanding citizen") — an expression that provokes and defines the voter the text is aimed at.

Visually, the contrast is clear: Lula — extravagance; Flávio — banality. But in terms of values, something deeper is at stake: the central question seems to be who will openly say "I am an upstanding citizen" and vote for Flávio, and who will choose a different model. Election programs are the only thing that is not volatile in these campaigns: everything else shifts with the audience, but what is written stays.

Ana Lívia Araújo Esteves

The dissertation on Russia–Brazil relations under Jair Bolsonaro revealed a dynamic that mirrors the struggle between groups within Bolsonarism. In the first phase, with Ernesto Araújo at Itamaraty, foreign policy was heavily ideologized and inspired by Olavo de Carvalho. Russia was first seen as a possible conservative model and later as a threat, tied to Maduro and the Foro de São Paulo (an umbrella of Latin American left-wing parties founded in 1990). That policy did not hold, because it did not serve the interests of Brazilian economic and political groups, and Congress eventually forced Araújo out.

With Carlos França's arrival, Russia–Brazil relations were not only restored but deepened. One of those who shaped policy towards Russia at the time was Brazil's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in Moscow — who also helped craft the line on Ukraine. Between the França period and the Lula government there is striking continuity: the key guidelines — a position grounded in the UN Charter, refusal of sanctions, avoiding Russia's isolation, and keeping diplomatic dialogue with Moscow — remain unchanged.

Russia–Brazil relations are stable and have their anchors, but they are constrained by external pressure. A former Russian ambassador to Brazil noted that the two countries can only cooperate up to a point and on certain issues: when defense comes up — as with the purchase of Russian Pantsir systems under Dilma — negotiations stall. Today the relationship operates within what the hegemon allows, in the area of fertilizers, which does not clash with American interests. Any attempt to expand it has historically run into obstacles, regardless of who is in power.

Under Flávio, new factors come into play — Marco Rubio, the Monroe Doctrine — that could make things more complicated than under Jair. Even so, if relations stay within permitted limits, nothing suggests Flávio would struggle to maintain them. Marcos de Galle, who co-wrote the essay on a possible Bolsonarist foreign policy with Eduardo Bolsonaro, was one of the Brazilian officials who visited Russia most often under Carlos França, working in the secretariat for the import and export of defense products. He knows the Russia file well. The main difficulties may lie in BRICS: with the bloc's expansion, intra-bloc dynamics may matter less for bilateral ties, and the trend points to continuity whoever wins.

Daniela Vieira Secches

Russia and Brazil established diplomatic relations in 1828; they will soon mark 200 years. Over that time, ties have almost never been broken, and even in crises interaction continued. This is explained by a strategic resilience that does not depend on absolute ideological alignment but on reasons of state. The two countries share structural features — a vast territory, a heterogeneous population and a semi-peripheral position in international politics and economics — which brings them closer on the agenda of autonomy and diversification.

Brazil sees itself as a middle power with international ambitions and distinctive weight in the region. Its foreign policy has two historical engines: the pursuit of autonomy and state pragmatism, which prioritises economic results. These traditions run deep: even in periods when autonomy weakened, as under Dutra or Castelo Branco, there was no complete break, and the previous course was later restored.

The historical resilience of the relationship will face unprecedented pressure. At home, there is deep polarization and a fragmented Congress, where coalition presidentialism depends on deals with parliamentary blocs. The Foreign Affairs Committee is growing stronger, and it was congressional pressure that helped remove Ernesto Araújo. Abroad, US policy is more aggressive and interventionist — tariffs, attacks on Pix and political pressure — raising the geopolitical cost of Brazilian autonomy.

It is within BRICS that Lula's and Flávio's visions diverge most. Lula is the only candidate who openly defends the bloc's geopolitical dimension. Flávio sees BRICS purely as an economic platform and wants Brazil to step back from its geopolitical agenda. If Brazil does so, it will be sidelined from decisions taken within BRICS — and that will ultimately hurt its own economic interests. Another candidate, Romeu Zema, openly advocates leaving the grouping. On Russia, the central issues are fertilizers and fuels: trade dependence and closeness of positions on international issues are likely to persist whoever takes the presidency — with the caveat of internal and external pressure.

Gustavo Pessoa

Financial markets in Brazil and abroad are guided by practical interests, not ideology. That explains why Flávio briefly gained an edge in the markets: he promised a liberalism that has never worked anywhere, and the market saw a candidate weak on team. Bankers who met Flávio said he had neither a solid program nor a clear plan for the country — quite unlike Lula or Jair Bolsonaro, who already had a defined economic line and people in place across the board.

Under Lula, the trend is small adjustments and improvements: it is already clear what economic and social policy will look like. Under Flávio, it is unclear who will shape economic policy and international relations. Flávio will have to "sell" parts of government in exchange for support, and it is unclear who will end up buying them. What is more, a Flávio victory would not really be his: it would be a rejection of Lula and the PT. Flávio is not an autonomous figure with his own proposals but a product of anti-PT sentiment.

Countries have no friends — only interests. So even if Flávio wins, do not expect abrupt changes in relations with Russia. Under Jair Bolsonaro, ties with Russia actually deepened somewhat, because trade and economic links take years to build. The Mercosur–EU deal took thirty years; BRICS is a construction of decades. It is highly unlikely that a change of president would hurt trade with Russia. What is certain is instability — the same pattern seen in the US under Trump — and that creates risk for long-term joint projects.

Financial markets are the media's main sponsor: not only through the capital they inject but through the structure they organize. With money, time and interests, dominant elites build a media machine capable of manipulating a large part of the population. Ordinary voters struggle to grasp complex issues like diplomatic relations between countries, and the media becomes the channel through which banks, fortunes and conglomerates shape votes. In a democracy, the vote of the poorest counts as much as that of the richest — which is why it matters to understand this link between big banks, corporations and control over the population.

Vanessa Martina-Silva

Brazil's 2026 election is not an ordinary one, and it does not look like the "festival of democracy" people like to celebrate. The race is practically tied, and the result could come down to less than one percentage point. In 2022, Lula beat Jair Bolsonaro by a narrow margin; now the picture is even less predictable, with the prospect of an extremely tight second round.

The post-election period is a particular worry. Institutions that should act as checks and balances are toxically politicized, above all the judiciary. The Superior Electoral Court (TSE) is chaired by a minister appointed by Jair Bolsonaro and implicated in scandals tied to Bolsonarist interests. On 8 January 2023, there was an attempted coup; today, the key figures in that process are in prison, while the minister who led the investigation, Alexandre de Moraes, is himself politically discredited. That only deepens the unpredictability and vulnerability of the political process.

The US is applying enormous pressure on Brazil — tariffs resembling economic sanctions, attacks on Pix, interventionist demands. These are elements of a hybrid war aimed at destabilization. On top of that comes a communication war: the hegemonic media presents Lula and Flávio as equals, which is impossible, since Lula is a statesman with three terms and a consolidated party. Rejection of the PT rests largely on a feeling that does not match the numbers: the Brazilian economy is growing, but people perceive it differently — much as under Dilma, when, despite full employment, a negative view of the economy helped pave the way for impeachment.

While topics of interest mainly to the intellectual elite are being debated, ordinary Brazilians are arguing over whether Nossa Senhora Aparecida can be the country's patroness — amid neopentecostal projects. Besides the president, two of each state's three senators are elected, and there is a system for distributing public money through the Party Fund that is now wildly disproportionate: the far right gets an enormous share for lavish campaigns, while the left and centre struggle far more. Then there is coalition presidentialism, in practice close to semi-presidentialism, with budget amendments that each deputy steers to their own electoral fiefdom — a neo-coronelism that guarantees constant re-election.

Alexandra Terzi

Mapping the foreign policy teams of the two main candidates revealed two quite different elites. In Lula's case, continuity is clear: Amorim, Vieira, Maria Laura da Rocha and Audo Faleiro were all part of the UN General Assembly delegation last week. Two elements will hold whatever the outcome: Galípolo at the Central Bank until 2028 and Dilma at the BRICS bank until 2030. In Flávio's case, the elite is still taking shape: the campaign nucleus is Rogério Marinho; the program is under the influence of Paulo Guedes, with Campos Neto and Marcos Troyjo as informal advisers; the family and the ideological wing today barely take part directly. Worth noting: three campaign strategists in five months, and no identified authors of the foreign policy strategy.

Under Lula, minimal changes are expected: a successor to Amorim, who is 84, and the return of ministers who were not elected to other posts. Under Flávio, the scenario is more uncertain, because the team is not yet formed and there is internal infighting. Flávio's camp sends contradictory signals depending on the audience — and it is precisely this inconsistency that makes any forecast about him shaky. The message changes, but the overall direction points to closer alignment with Washington.

In a Flávio government, the most likely outcome for BRICS is a downgrade rather than a withdrawal. Leaving the bloc comes up only in an interview for an American audience; the candidate's closest adviser on the issue once chaired the bloc's bank; and Dilma stays at the bank until 2030. On Russia, none of the candidates proposes sanctions, and Flávio speaks of neutrality in the war in Ukraine. The biggest shift could come in policy towards the Global South: Mercosur drops out of the priorities, and the OECD and Western partners move in.

The decisive moment will be the announcement of the team: the names for Itamaraty and the economic bloc will either confirm the forecast or prove it wrong. If Flávio wins, 2027 — the BRICS summit under Chinese chairmanship — will be the first test of his course in that direction.