Russia
Source: bricscouncil.ru

Extreme weather events, including droughts and floods, are among the most significant threats to food security. Unlike economic or political risks, they arise largely beyond the direct control of governments and are considerably harder to manage. Since the onset of climate shocks cannot be controlled, preparedness is the only way to minimise their risks and consequences. This requires appropriate agricultural infrastructure and strategies to support vulnerable groups. At the same time, climate shocks can disrupt all four dimensions of food security: food availability (by reducing domestic production and food stocks); physical and economic access (primarily through their effects on food prices and household incomes); and resilience and stability.

Ethiopia: climate and food in numbers

African countries are particularly vulnerable to climate-related risks, and Ethiopia is a case in point. Agriculture has long been the backbone of the Ethiopian economy, accounting for more than 30% of GDP, supporting the livelihoods of around 80–85% of the population and generating up to 90% of export earnings. About 95% of agricultural output comes from smallholder farms, which may lack the resources to weather a crisis. This structure illustrates how extreme weather events can have both production-related and economic consequences, with the latter felt at both the microeconomic and macroeconomic levels. For example, agricultural exports as a share of Ethiopia’s GDP have fallen markedly over recent decades, from 6.8% in 2010 to 1.6% in 2023, and have generally continued to decline in recent years.

The sharp decline in several key agricultural indicators in 2016 was primarily linked to one of the most severe droughts in decades. Driven by El Niño, the 2015–2016 drought had a significant impact on Ethiopia’s economy. Successive crop failures and widespread livestock losses followed, with agricultural and pastoral production falling by 50–90% in some areas. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), around 7.5 million farmers needed emergency assistance to restore agricultural production. Overall, approximately 10.2 million Ethiopians faced the threat of hunger and chronic undernourishment.

In subsequent years, climate-related pressures increasingly coincided with other crises. The decline or slowdown in certain agricultural indicators after 2016 was most likely driven by several overlapping factors, including recurrent droughts, floods and locust infestations since 2018, political conflicts and the COVID-19 pandemic. A distinctive feature of climate risks in Ethiopia is their cumulative impact: repeated adverse events deplete productive assets and household resources, reducing people’s ability to recover before the next crisis strikes.

Although the 2015–2016 climate shock was exceptional in scale, El Niño and the associated climate anomalies remain a source of risk to Ethiopia’s food security. According to the World Food Programme (WFP), more than 1.3 million people are expected to face acute food insecurity between October and December 2026, partly as a result of El Niño.

Against a backdrop of successive severe climatic and other shocks, this heavy dependence on natural conditions has left Ethiopia among the countries most vulnerable to food insecurity, not only within BRICS but worldwide.

Over the past decade, Ethiopia has recorded the highest prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity among BRICS countries, at more than twice the global average of 25.8%. More than half of the country’s population (60.1%) lacks adequate access to food. In other words, these people live in households where at least one adult has, at some point during the year, experienced poor-quality diets and had to reduce food consumption because of insufficient money or other resources. The prevalence of food insecurity increased throughout the period beginning in 2009, although the figures for 2023–2025 indicate a decline from 61.4% in 2023.

Ethiopia also has the highest prevalence of undernourishment among BRICS countries: 19.9% in 2023–2025, around 2.5 times the global average of 7.8%. Unlike the previous indicator, the trend is less straightforward and clearly reflects the decline in agricultural production associated with the 2015–2016 drought discussed above. The rate fell gradually from 24.3% in 2009 to 13.6% in 2016, before rising to around 20.6–20.8% in 2021–2023. As with the previous indicator, the latest figures for 2023–2025 show a decline. This may lead to some stabilisation of the country’s food security situation, although it remains to be seen whether the trend will last.

Food insecurity offers a clear illustration of how climate risks and financial vulnerability reinforce each other. Among BRICS countries, Ethiopia has the highest share of people living below the poverty line and one of the highest levels of income inequality, second only to South Africa. Although the poverty rate has declined substantially, from 80% in 2009 to 36% in 2026, it has remained significantly higher than in other BRICS countries throughout 2009–2026. As in other low-income countries, poorer households in Ethiopia devote much of their income to food. Even a modest increase in food prices caused by climate shocks can therefore put food beyond the reach of vulnerable groups.

While climate shocks cannot be fully controlled, their impact on food security can be significantly reduced by making the agricultural sector more resilient and better able to recover from crises. Ethiopia is already implementing several initiatives to build climate-resilient agriculture, including a project to expand irrigation networks and the National Wheat Development Initiative, a comprehensive programme aimed at achieving wheat self-sufficiency.

To support vulnerable populations, Ethiopia is also implementing the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), described as the world’s second-largest social protection programme for rural households. It provides assistance in cash or in kind, as well as support for farmers during extreme weather events, particularly droughts. The programme is designed to address both chronic food shortages among the poorest groups and short-term shocks. It combines targeted assistance for vulnerable groups, public works aimed at improving infrastructure, and risk-financing mechanisms. According to the World Bank’s 2026 figures, more than 23 million people received emergency assistance through the crisis response platform during the programme’s fifth phase. Approximately 2,600 infrastructure facilities were also rehabilitated. The new, sixth phase aims to improve food security by expanding access to employment, placing particular emphasis on women and young people, and strengthening climate resilience.

Cooperation within BRICS could make an additional contribution to addressing climate risks. First, several members have already gained valuable experience in strengthening agricultural resilience and adapting farming practices to different climate challenges. Second, pooling scientific, technological and financial resources could help build more resilient food systems.

One avenue is existing South–South cooperation, particularly the FAO–China South–South Cooperation (SSC) Programme in African countries. This model enables countries to share technologies, knowledge and practical experience, helping partner countries build capacity and support their development. BRICS also has mechanisms for information exchange and joint research, including the BRICS Agricultural Research Platform (BARP) and the BRICS Agricultural Information Exchange System (BAIES).

For Ethiopia, relevant areas of cooperation on climate risks include sharing technologies for growing hybrid cereal varieties (drawing on the experience of China and India) and irrigation (China, India and Iran), as well as expertise in agricultural mechanisation (China, India and Brazil) and digital agriculture (China, India and Indonesia). The 16th BRICS Agriculture Ministers’ Declaration also notes plans to establish the BRICS Network of Centres of Excellence (CoE) on Agroecology and Regenerative Agriculture for Climate Resilience and Productivity, with a view to deepening cooperation on climate resilience.

In the areas of finance and infrastructure, the same declaration places particular emphasis on developing business partnerships to encourage investment within BRICS in locally produced machinery and equipment suited to smallholder and family farms. The New Development Bank (NDB) could provide a larger source of infrastructure finance. Established by BRICS member countries, the NDB finances infrastructure and sustainable development projects both within the grouping and in other developing countries. Ethiopia is currently among the prospective members approved by the NDB’s Board of Governors. Completing its accession could become a major driver of technological development for sustainable agriculture, especially given Ethiopia’s limited domestic resources.

Another promising avenue is the initiative to establish strategic food reserves for use in times of crisis. Proposed in April 2026 amid food security risks arising from the crisis in the Middle East, this mechanism could also help mitigate the effects of climate shocks by offsetting temporary declines in domestic production and disruptions to food supplies.

Ethiopia’s experience thus shows that climate shocks pose the greatest threat to food security where resources are insufficient to help the agricultural sector and local populations adapt to their consequences.
The key task, both at the national level and through international cooperation, including within BRICS, is therefore not to eliminate climate risks as such, but to develop effective strategies for reducing vulnerability. In this respect, BRICS has considerable potential to bring together technological, scientific and financial resources to strengthen the resilience of food systems, not only in its member countries but across the Global South.

The material was prepared specially for the BRICS Expert Council-Russia

This text reflects the personal opinion of the authors', which may not coincide with the position of the BRICS Expert Council-Russia

Russia
Source: bricscouncil.ru

In early October 2026, Ghana announced its intention to join BRICS. As the country’s foreign minister, Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa, clarified, Accra is seeking partner-country status rather than full membership. President John Mahama nevertheless expects closer ties with BRICS to help Ghana expand trade, attract investment and develop domestic industry. Ghana has no intention of abandoning its traditional partners. On the contrary, its government hopes to benefit from a broader pool of potential investors.

This logic is hardly new. Back in 2011, as South Africa was joining BRIC, it saw participation in the grouping as an opportunity to expand its economic prospects, boost trade and attract investment. Fifteen years later, other African countries have similar expectations. Egypt and Ethiopia have already joined BRICS, while Nigeria and Uganda have become partner countries.

More African states are seeking closer relations with the grouping. Its political appeal is clear, but how far can it meet the economic expectations of its newer participants?

For Russia, this is a particularly important question. The third Russia–Africa Summit is currently taking place in Moscow. Its outcomes are expected to include an Action Plan for 2027–2029, a final declaration and a declaration on cooperation in artificial intelligence. The signing of more than 30 interdepartmental documents has also been announced. This raises a question about how the two frameworks relate to one another: Moscow is developing its own platform for engagement with African countries while also participating in BRICS, which is expanding cooperation with Africa as well. Their priorities largely overlap, ranging from food security and energy to infrastructure, digital technologies and skills development.

The need to bring the two platforms closer together was formally acknowledged in 2023. The declaration of the second Russia–Africa Summit called for stronger BRICS–Africa partnership. Less than a month later, the BRICS Summit in Johannesburg made cooperation with the African continent a central theme. Yet three years on, no concrete mechanism has emerged for linking the two frameworks. Perhaps the problem is not a lack of political will, but the way the task itself has been framed.

From a Continent-Wide Agenda to Sectoral Coalitions

The Russia–Africa Partnership Forum’s greatest strength is also its main limitation. The format makes it possible to maintain political dialogue with all the countries of the continent, but achieving comparable results with each of them is far more difficult.

Delegations from 48 African countries are represented at the summit in Moscow, including 22 countries represented at the level of heads of state. These figures are worth keeping in mind.

Africa comprises 54 countries with different economic structures, regional tensions, development needs and views of Russia’s place among their external partners.

Some need supplies of grain and fertiliser; others are interested in building processing industries, developing energy systems or improving transport infrastructure. Political conditions also vary: some countries face armed conflicts, some have had their membership in the African Union suspended, and regional integration organizations are dealing with crises of their own.

Under these conditions, agreeing on a broad common agenda is relatively straightforward. Turning that agenda into projects that actually work is much harder. The Russia–Africa Action Plan for 2023–2026, adopted in St Petersburg, contains 181 provisions covering virtually every area of international cooperation. But the number of agreed areas of cooperation says little about its effectiveness unless each has identifiable implementing organizations, funding and measurable results.

The next stage of Russia–Africa dialogue could involve gradually shifting the emphasis from an all-encompassing continental agenda to a limited number of sector-specific initiatives.

These could bring together groups of countries facing similar needs and challenges. A successful project in one country could then provide a model for expansion to others. This approach would avoid the need to agree on a single solution for the entire continent every time, while preserving the summit’s role as an overarching political forum.

This is where BRICS could prove particularly useful.

Partners or Competitors?

As BRICS expands, it is creating something of a network of “anchor countries” in Africa. South Africa has a well-developed financial and industrial base; Egypt holds an important position in the transport system linking North Africa and the Middle East; and Ethiopia is one of East Africa’s key political centres. Nigeria and Uganda, which have gained partner-country status, offer opportunities to broaden dialogue with countries in West and East Africa.

Yet expectations should not be overstated. Neither BRICS membership nor partner-country status automatically makes a state an advocate for Russian interests. Moreover, Russian businesses compete in African markets with companies from China, India and other members of the grouping.

China has a more developed infrastructure for trade and investment cooperation with Africa. Since May 2026, it has extended zero import tariffs to all 53 African countries with which it maintains diplomatic relations. India is also actively expanding its economic ties with the continent. According to India’s Ministry of External Affairs, bilateral trade reached US$93 billion in the preceding year, while total Indian investment in Africa exceeded US$80 billion. New Delhi places particular emphasis on pharmaceuticals, digital technologies, skills training and infrastructure projects.

For African countries participating in BRICS, such competition is more of an advantage: it allows them to choose among different offers.

For Russia, this means that projects proposed to its partners must be economically attractive in their own right. Political affinity among BRICS participants is unlikely to be enough on its own.

Competition, however, does not preclude cooperation. Interests may converge around the development of transport corridors, the creation of production chains or the training of specialists for industries in which BRICS companies already operate in African markets. What matters is that cooperation grows out of a specific project rather than an abstract commitment to stronger multilateral ties.

One Initiative, Several Frameworks

Food security is a useful example. Russia wants to expand exports of grain, fertilisers and agricultural technologies, while many African countries seek to diversify supplies, reduce exposure to global price fluctuations and modernize their agricultural sectors. At the forum, Vladimir Putin said that more than 40 African countries receive Russian grain and fertilisers, and that Russia exported 13 million tonnes of
agricultural products to Africa between January and September 2026.

BRICS is discussing the creation of a grain exchange platform. In September 2026, its members also agreed to establish AGRIN, a network for cooperation on agricultural technologies, seed resources and information exchange. These initiatives are at different stages of development and do not yet constitute a single functioning mechanism, but a practical foundation is gradually taking shape. In February 2026, the St. Petersburg International Mercantile Exchange and the Egyptian Mercantile Exchange signed a memorandum of understanding. Around the same time, a specialised BRICS working group met in Cairo with the participation of HSE University to discuss competition in food markets.

Why not consider this field as a potential pilot project linking the Russia–Africa agenda with BRICS instruments?

Russia and Egypt could begin by testing arrangements for exchange-based trade, reciprocal access to trading platforms and information support for shipments. Other interested African countries could then be invited to participate, with the model adapted to their markets and transport infrastructure. If demand is sufficient, the initiative could gradually cover a wider range of food products and agricultural technologies.

A similar approach could be applied to education and vocational training. Russia is already training specialists for nuclear-energy projects in Egypt and expanding cooperation with Ethiopia in the nuclear sector. BRICS has its own education, research and technology mechanisms, including the BRICS Network University and the BRICS Technical and Vocational Education and Training Cooperation Alliance. These could help extend successful training programmes to other interested countries, although the formal terms of participation would still need to be agreed on.

Financing is, of course, more complicated. The BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) finances infrastructure projects in Africa, but membership in the grouping does not automatically provide access to its resources. Moreover, the bank has suspended new operations in Russia since March 2022, and the terms on which Russian companies could participate in NDB-financed projects abroad require separate consideration. The NDB should therefore not yet be treated as a universal financing instrument for Russia–Africa cooperation.
Cross-border payments could provide another practical link between the two agendas. At the Russia–Africa summit, there were renewed calls to increase settlements in national currencies, strengthen correspondent banking relationships and use alternative financial messaging systems, including the Financial Messaging System of the Bank of Russia and the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS). BRICS is also discussing tools for cross-border payments but connecting them with Russia–Africa initiatives will require separate agreements.

At the outset, relatively small projects that do not require complex financial arrangements may prove more effective. They offer an opportunity to produce tangible results and then extend a tested model to other countries.

What Should Be Done with the Two Agendas?

This raises a natural question: does Russia need to develop separate Africa cooperation programmes for the Russia–Africa Summit and for BRICS?

A more sensible approach would seem to work from a single set of priority projects while adapting the tools used to advance them to the capabilities of each platform.

The Russia–Africa Summit could serve to align interests and attract countries interested in particular initiatives; bilateral agreements could define the specific commitments of the parties; and BRICS mechanisms could provide additional expertise, technology or funding wherever such support is available and needed.

This arrangement would not require creating another international body. It would be more useful to include several cross-cutting sectoral initiatives in the Action Plan, identifying potential participating countries, responsible organisations and expected outcomes. As projects progress, new partners could be given the opportunity to join, including countries that do not currently participate in BRICS.

Ultimately, BRICS may offer the greatest value to Russia’s Africa policy by providing a new way to organize cooperation that already exists. A shift towards sectoral coalitions built around clearly defined groups of interested countries could make Russian initiatives in Africa more concrete and easier to replicate. If a successful project can expand beyond its initial group of participants, that would be more convincing evidence of Russia’s growing partnership with the “continent of the future” than a longer list of agreed areas for cooperation.

The material was prepared specially for the BRICS Expert Council-Russia

This text reflects the personal opinion of the authors', which may not coincide with the position of the BRICS Expert Council-Russia

Russia
Source: bricscouncil.ru

How do BRICS priorities align with the African Union’s Agenda 2063?

The programme for the Russia–Africa Summit was developed with due regard for the African Union’s (AU) policy documents. This reflects Russia’s and other BRICS partners’ intention to position themselves not as external actors imposing their own point of view, but as co-authors of Africa’s vision for its future. However, what matters most is not declarative alignment, but the existence of real mechanisms through which African countries can do more than adapt their priorities to the interests of major players in the bloc: they must also be able to influence the agenda forming process within BRICS.

Both BRICS summit declarations and Agenda 2063 invoke sovereignty, multipolarity and the reform of global governance. Yet this convergence of positions does not automatically guarantee adherence to the principle of “African solutions to African problems.” Making this principle a reality requires BRICS to support African agency, particularly in the field of security, where major powers have traditionally tended to act according to their own rules.

Unfortunately, a larger African presence in BRICS does not yet translate into stronger collective influence for African countries. Following the accession of Egypt and Ethiopia to BRICS and the granting of partner-country status to several other African states, Africa is now broadly represented in the alliance.

However, its BRICS members have yet to act as a unified bloc or develop a common agenda. Against this backdrop, the Russia–Africa Summit has a strong chance of serving as a “launchpad” for concrete action to bridge this gap.

Where do the interests of BRICS and Africa converge, and where might they clash?

Finance is the area where BRICS and Africa have the greatest convergence of interests, but the scale of the New Development Bank’s (NDB) operations and its rules limit the ability to support African countries. African countries have repeatedly pointed to the political conditionality attached to loans from traditional international institutions, and the NDB is positioned as an alternative in this regard. However, its current scale of operations remains far below the infrastructure financing needs of the African continent. Moreover, not all BRICS members support reforming the global financial rules.

BRICS and Africa are both interested in reforming global governance, but their proposed approaches to implementing this strategy differ. Both call for greater representation of developing countries in the UN Security Council and a review of outdated institutions. However, BRICS support for UN Security Council reform does not necessarily mean support for African candidates, since several members of the grouping are themselves seeking permanent seats in the Council and are therefore competing with African states.

The goals of economic cooperation between BRICS and African countries also differ to some extent. BRICS countries are interested in access to African resources, while Africa seeks to expand its exports. Their interests align when it comes to trade of raw materials but diverge when processed goods are involved. Africa’s development agenda, including Agenda 2063, prioritizes industrialization and the local processing of resources. If cooperation with BRICS is limited to the extraction and export of raw materials, it will reproduce the colonial model that the principle of “African solutions to African problems” seeks to overcome. This is why projects focused on processing, technology transfer and industrial cooperation are so important—not just trade deals involving raw commodities.

Debt sustainability remains the area of sharpest divergence. BRICS offers African countries alternative sources of financing without political conditions, including the NDB and bilateral loans from member countries, but it does not provide mechanisms to ease the burden of servicing existing debt. African countries spend as much as 60% of their budgets on debt servicing, making the debt issue a key argument in favour of alternative financial institutions. African BRICS members—Egypt, Ethiopia and South Africa—could initiate efforts to promote debt restructuring. However, there is no consensus within the grouping on this issue as BRICS creditors have little interest in establishing universal debt-relief mechanisms. In these circumstances, the Russia–Africa Summit could demonstrate BRICS’ willingness to offer Africa not only new credit lines, but also tools for managing its existing debt.

Payment infrastructure is one of the most developed areas of converging interests between BRICS and African countries. However, the development of payment systems that do not interact with one another could create new fragmentation rather than a unified payments space.

Russia’s A7 platform, which Nigeria and Zimbabwe have joined, enables African countries to make payments in national currencies not only to Russia, but also to China and India.

Meanwhile, the BRICS Bridge project is under discussion, alongside potential links between BRICS central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) and Africa’s Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS). This gives African countries a way to reduce their dependence on the US dollar and speed up settlements. However, a proliferation of uncoordinated “bridges” and platforms could leave African businesses facing not a single alternative channel, but a new patchwork of incompatible standards. The key question, therefore, is not how many new payment systems are launched, but how well they are connected and made interoperable.

The material was prepared specially for the BRICS Expert Council-Russia

This text reflects the personal opinion of the authors', which may not coincide with the position of the BRICS Expert Council-Russia

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Colleagues,
Friends,

I am pleased to greet the organisers and participants of the BRICS Interregional Business Forum, an important element of the architecture of cooperation within the group.

Despite the turbulent geopolitical situation, countries of the Global Majority are demonstrating a genuine interest in expanding multifaceted cooperation with one another and, in particular, with the Russian Federation. It is symbolic that you have gathered in St Petersburg, our country’s northern and cultural capital and a dynamically developing business centre of global significance.

Today, BRICS is one of the driving forces behind global economic growth. The association accounts for 40 percent of global GDP in terms of purchasing power parity and 23 percent of world trade. Trade between BRICS states has already reached $1.2 trillion.

We believe it is important not to rest on our laurels but to continue our joint efforts to fully unlock the considerable potential for mutually beneficial cooperation. This is the aim of Russia’s initiatives, including the development of international payment mechanisms resilient to external shocks and the establishment of a New Investment Platform to attract capital to key sectors of the economies of BRICS countries and the nations of the Global South and East in general.

Your meeting will also make a significant contribution to our common efforts to expand practical cooperation. Participants will have an opportunity to exchange experience on a wide range of issues essential to the prosperity of our regions and cities, as well as to review progress in implementing joint business projects.
I am confident that the forum will take place in a traditionally constructive atmosphere, helping to establish new business contacts, strengthen existing ties and promote friendship, mutual understanding and partnership between our countries and peoples. An extensive cultural programme will also give participants an opportunity to learn more about the rich historical and cultural heritage of St Petersburg, which can be rightfully called a unique open-air museum.

I wish you fruitful discussions.

coutry
Source: mid.ru

Russian Ambassador to India Denis Alipov’s interview to Sansad TV ahead of the visit of Chairman of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation Vyacheslav Volodin to New Delhi to attend the 12th BRICS Parliamentary Forum.

Key points:

• The outcomes of the 18th BRICS Leaders’ Summit demonstrated the unity and effectiveness of the grouping. The consensus Declaration reaffirmed common approaches to reforming global governance and advancing a multipolar world order;
• Continuity from Kazan to Rio de Janeiro to New Delhi ensures the consistent advancement of joint initiatives, including the development of independent payment mechanisms, the New Investment Platform and the BRICS Grain Exchange;
• The priorities of India’s BRICS Chairship resonate with Russia’s vision for the grouping. The areas with the greatest potential for cooperation include finance, energy, food security, logistics and digital technologies;
• BRICS advances the interests of the Global South, amplifying the voice of the countries representing the World Majority, helping to address institutional imbalances and promoting equal access to financial resources and modern technologies;
• The BRICS Parliamentary Forum plays an important role in translating leaders’ decisions into practical action, harmonising national legislation and strengthening interparliamentary dialogue;
• Vyacheslav Volodin’s upcoming visit to India will be his first foreign visit since his re-election as Chairman of the State Duma and will provide fresh impetus to Russian-Indian parliamentary dialogue ahead of the 80th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 2027.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

BRICS Interregional Business Forum

The BRICS Interregional Business Forum will be held in St Petersburg on October 29-31. Representatives from the business community, regional executive authorities, and expert circles from 63 countries are expected to attend, with more than 3,500 participants in total. Practical interregional cooperation, including the expansion of trade and economic ties, industrial cooperation, investment promotion, and the development of new partnerships will take centre stage during the discussions.

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov will send a message of greetings to the organisers and participants.
We look forward to the BRICS Interregional Business Forum helping broaden the geographical reach of business contacts, developing new practical solutions in urban planning, and strengthening humanitarian ties.

Russia
Source: www.akm.ru

Maxim Reshetnikov, Minister of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, suggested that African countries use existing project support mechanisms within the framework of the BRICS association. This was reported on the website of the Ministry of Economic Development following a speech by the head of the ministry at the session "The BRICS Platform as a catalyst for Russian-African business cooperation" within the framework of the Russia—Africa summit.

The necessary support mechanisms have been established for the implementation of joint projects within the framework of the BRICS. In particular, at the initiative of the Russian side, the BRICS International Association of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) was established, and an investment navigator was launched.
This digital resource contains comprehensive information about domestic SEZs, their residents, available sites, investment projects, and current preferential regimes. The States of the African continent are offered the opportunity to integrate into this platform.

In the humanitarian sphere, Russia has invited African countries to participate in the BEST Platform, the BRICS mechanism for the exchange and implementation of environmentally sound technologies.

Ethiopia
Source: ethiopia7.com

A Russian business council leader says the group plans to test the freight route through Djibouti to Addis Ababa, but no timetable has been announced.

Ethiopia is among four countries proposed for BRICS project portfolios, with a Russian business council leader saying the group intends to test the freight chain through Djibouti to Addis Ababa. The proposal was presented at the Russia–Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum in Moscow on 28 October.

Andrey Guryev, head of the Russian chapter of the BRICS Business Council, proposed developing country portfolios with Egypt, Ethiopia and South Africa. He said national BRICS business platforms could also be launched with Nigeria, Uganda and other partners, alongside a register of pilot international projects. The aim, he said, is to build a project base ahead of China’s BRICS chairmanship in 2027.

For Ethiopia, the stated focus is practical trade logistics: the council intends to test the Russia–Djibouti–Addis Ababa route, including freight charges, customs and certification. The proposal could help identify what is required to move goods along the chain, but the council has not announced a timetable, specific cargoes or Ethiopian partners.

What the Ethiopia plan involves

Guryev described the logistics chain as a test, not as an operational service. The announcement did not specify which companies or agencies would take part, how the test would be carried out, or whether Ethiopian authorities have agreed to participate.

The wider proposal is to move cooperation from general trade towards joint projects and production. Guryev cited Russian passenger carriages supplied to Egypt, fitted with 800 climate-control systems developed and supplied by a South African company. He said the model could be extended to energy, digital platforms and technology.

What has been agreed so far

The portfolios remain a proposal from the Russian chapter of the BRICS Business Council; no completed project list or formal agreement involving Ethiopia was announced at the forum. Russian Economic Development Minister Maksim Reshetnikov said BRICS was developing initiatives including an independent payment infrastructure, an association of special economic zones and a grain exchange.

Other plans discussed at the session included a Russian industrial zone in Egypt’s Suez Canal area, whose first residents are expected to be selected by year-end and which is expected to begin operating in 2027–2028. Those plans are separate from the proposed Ethiopia logistics test.

This report draws on information from TV BRICS.

India
Source: www.pib.gov.in

12TH BRICS PARLIAMENTARY FORUM CONCLUDES IN NEW DELHI, WITH ADOPTION OF A JOINT DECLARATION

JOINT DECLARATION REAFFIRMS CONSENSUS OF NEW DELHI DECLARATION (NDD); ENDORSES UNSC REFORM AND MORE REPRESENTATION OF GLOBAL SOUTH IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

JOINT DECLARATION CONDEMNS CROSS-BORDER TERRORISM, TERROR FINANCING, AND SAFE HAVENS; DEMANDS ZERO TOLERANCE AND END TO DOUBLE STANDARDS

PERMANENT SOLUTIONS TO GLOBAL CHALLENGES LIE IN DIALOGUE, PEACE, AND COOPERATION: LOK SABHA SPEAKER

LOK SABHA SPEAKER PUSHES FOR SOVEREIGN EQUALITY AND GLOBAL SOUTH PRIORITIES AT 12TH BRICS PARLIAMENTARY FORUM

PARLIAMENTS MUST EVOLVE INTO TRANSPARENT, CITIZEN-CENTRIC INSTITUTIONS TO SAFEGUARD PUBLIC TRUST: LOK SABHA SPEAKER

RESPONSIBLE TECHNOLOGY AND AI CAN SIGNIFICANTLY EMPOWER PARLIAMENTS AND ENHANCE LAWMAKER EFFICIENCY: LOK SABHA SPEAKER

LOK SABHA SPEAKER HANDS OVER BRICS PARLIAMENTARY FORUM CHAIRSHIP TO CHINA
Posted On: 27 OCT 2026 4:34PM by PIB Delhi


The 12th BRICS Parliamentary Forum, which was inaugurated by Lok Sabha Speaker Shri Om Birla yesterday, concluded today with the adoption of a Joint Declaration. The declaration formally reiterates member nations' dedication to the principles of the United Nations Charter, sovereign equality, mutual respect, non-interference in internal affairs, and the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Demonstrating India’s growing diplomatic footprint under its ongoing chairship, the Joint Declaration seamlessly aligned with New Delhi’s core strategic priorities. Reaffirming the consensus of the New Delhi Declaration (NDD), member parliaments issued an explicit endorsement of UN Security Council reform - referencing NDD Paragraph 13 - to make global governance more representative of the Global South.
India’s firm stance on national security scored a major victory through robust, uncompromised counter-terrorism language; building on NDD Paragraph 40, the declaration condemned cross-border terrorism, terror financing, and safe havens while demanding zero tolerance and an end to double standards. The final text also strongly embedded India-led developmental and climate agendas, including the expansion of Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) repositories, ethical Artificial Intelligence governance, adherence to Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR-RC), and unanimous support for India’s BRICS Chairship.


Delivering the valedictory address, Lok Sabha Speaker emphasised that global challenges can only be resolved through steadfast dialogue, mutual peace, and collaborative action rather than conflict.
Addressing presiding officers, distinguished delegates, and international parliamentarians from BRICS member and partner nations, Shri Birla reflected on two days of profound discussions. He noted that while participating nations possess diverse backgrounds, circumstances, and challenges, their shared commitment to humanity's welfare, peace, and prosperity remains the ultimate strength of the BRICS coalition.


Highlighting the current global climate of instability, economic uncertainty, and regional conflicts, Shri Birla reiterated India’s core philosophy: permanent solutions are forged in dialogue, not war; in peace, not conflict; and in collaboration, rather than competition. He called for a global framework built on absolute respect for national sovereignty, peaceful resolution of international disputes, and equitable development opportunities for all. "Global peace truly means security, respect, justice, and the assurance of a better future for everyone - especially the younger generation,” he stated, noting that coming generations will judge current leaders by the safety and prosperity of the world they leave behind.


Underscoring the evolving responsibilities of democratic institutions, Lok Sabha Speaker emphasized that Parliaments are not merely law-making bodies, but vital centers of dialogue, consensus, accountability, and public trust. He urged global legislatures to adapt to changing times by becoming more effective, transparent, and citizen-centric. Addressing the integration of modern tools, Shri Birla noted that the adoption of Artificial Intelligence and digital technology can heavily optimize parliamentary workflows and deepen citizen participation, provided its development aligns strictly with human values, ethics, transparency, and accountability.


Shri Birla stressed that the success of BRICS must extend far beyond the progress of its individual member States to benefit the wider international community, granting proper representation to the aspirations of the Global South in global decision-making processes.


As the 12th BRICS Parliamentary Forum successfully concluded, Shri Birla extended warm congratulations and best wishes to China, which assumes the BRICS chair for the year 2027, expressing full confidence that cooperation will continue to flourish under its leadership. The forum concluded with a resounding call to action for Parliaments worldwide to serve as powerful voices for peace, cooperation, and shared prosperity.

India
Source: static.pib.gov.in

Joint Declaration 12th BRICS Parliamentary Forum New Delhi, India 26-27 October 2026 “Fostering Parliaments for People-Centric Development”

1. We, the Presiding Officers and representatives of the Parliaments of the BRICS member countries: namely, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the People’s Republic of China, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the Republic of India, the Republic of Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Russian Federation, the Republic of South Africa and the United Arab Emirates convened at the 12th BRICS Parliamentary Forum (12th BRICS PF) in New Delhi, India on 26-27 October 2026 under the theme “Fostering Parliaments For People-Centric Development”.

2. We extend a warm welcome for the participation of Partner countries in the 12th BRICS PF and acknowledge their invaluable contributions to inter-parliamentary cooperation. We reaffirm our commitment to fostering an inclusive, mutually beneficial, and development-oriented partnership with Partner countries, and encourage their increasing involvement in BRICS engagements and practical cooperation in areas of shared interest.

3. We express our support to India’s BRICS Chairship in 2026 themed: "Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability”, which reflects our shared commitment to strengthening BRICS cooperation to address common challenges in a balanced, inclusive and forward-looking manner.

4. We congratulate India on successfully hosting the 18th BRICS Summit from 12-13 September 2026 and welcome the adoption of the New Delhi Leaders Declaration. Furthermore, we extend our full support to India for the remainder of its BRICS Chairship in 2026.

5. We affirm our legislative support to strengthen the BRICS Strategic Partnership within the respective constitutional mandates and competencies of member Parliaments, across the three pillars of cooperation: political and security, economic and financial, cultural and people-topeople exchanges. We reaffirm our commitment to the BRICS spirit of mutual respect and understanding, equality, solidarity, openness, inclusiveness, and consensus. 2

6. We reiterate the significance of BRICS cultural and people-to-people exchanges and initiatives in fostering mutual understanding, friendship and cooperation amongst our nations and peoples. In this context, we welcome the organisation of key people-to-people engagements, including in the fields of culture, sport, art, education, women and youth affairs, under India’s Chairship. We call for more efforts to respect diversity of cultures, highly value inheritance, innovation and creativity, jointly advocate robust international people-to-people exchanges and cooperation and recall the adoption of the UNGA Resolution A/RES/78/286 entitled “International Day for Dialogue among Civilizations”.

7. We reaffirm our adherence to the principles of sovereign equality, mutual respect, non-intervention in internal affairs, and the peaceful settlement of international disputes, as enshrined in the United Nations Charter, as essential foundations for global stability, peace and development.

8. We recognise that inter-parliamentary cooperation constitutes an important component of the BRICS cooperation framework. It serves as a unique channel to foster mutual understanding, build trust among nations, support the peaceful resolution of international disputes, strengthen our international cooperation and promote the values of inclusiveness, solidarity, and sustainable development. In this regard, we reaffirm the role of the BRICS Parliamentary Forum and acknowledge the considerable contributions made by the eleven preceding meetings of the BRICS Parliamentary Forum in strengthening inter-parliamentary dialogue and cooperation among the Parliaments of the BRICS member countries.

9. We look forward to strengthening BRICS interaction within international parliamentary fora, including the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), to amplify the voice of the Global South. In this regard, we take note of Russia’s initiative to consider the idea of establishing a BRICS Plus geopolitical group within IPU.

10. We welcome the constructive inter-parliamentary dialogue conducted during the 12th BRICS Parliamentary Forum, which focused on the role of Parliaments in strengthening institutional resilience, harnessing digital technologies to address challenges faced by developing countries, fostering a more representative and inclusive global governance, promoting sustainability and accelerating collective global actions for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

11. We reaffirm our commitment to diligently working towards the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its comprehensive people-centred Goals and targets in a balanced and integrated manner, aligned with national policies and regulations. We acknowledge that eradicating poverty in all its forms, including extreme poverty, is the most significant global challenge and a prerequisite for sustainable development. We further recognise the importance of promoting the 2030 Agenda in an innovative, coordinated, environmentally sound, open and shared manner. We also look forward to close cooperation and substantive contribution of BRICS Countries in shaping the global agenda for the sustainable development beyond 2030. 3

12. Recognizing the urgency of addressing climate change, we call for intensifying efforts, through dialogue and international cooperation, to implement nationally determined contributions (NDCs), strengthen mitigation and adaptation efforts, and promote just transition pathways, with a view to achieving the objectives of the UNFCCC and the goals of its Paris Agreement as applicable, while reflecting equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances. Developed countries shall provide additional, adequate, predictable, accessible financial resources, capacity building support, technology development and transfer to developing countries on mutually agreed terms for adaptation.

13. We acknowledge the transformative potential of Emerging Technologies, including Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). We emphasise the necessity of ensuring the open, safe, secure, stable, equitably accessible, peaceful and interoperable use and development of ICTs environment while respecting sovereignty and national security of each country.

14. We recognize that Artificial Intelligence (AI) presents immense opportunity to stimulate economic growth and sustainable development for all. We further note the importance of international cooperation in enhancing equitable access to AI resources, capacity building, knowledge and opportunities in accordance with national priorities and applicable laws while ensuring the safe, secure inclusive and reliable development and use of AI. In addition, promoting energy efficiency of AI systems, fostering AI Science and Innovation, leveraging AI for economic growth and social good and mitigating potential risks would be essential for promoting a just, fair, equitable and prosperous future of all countries, especially those of Global South. We emphasize the need to strengthen the digital sovereignty of BRICS member countries by protecting data privacy and security of personal information as well as by building resilient national technological ecosystems.

15. We recognize the significant potential of using digital technologies and AI-driven solutions to strengthen parliamentary functions including parliamentary research, analysis, outreach, citizen interaction, and feedback. We encourage the BRICS Parliaments to share amongst each other the successful examples and best practices on the deployment of digital technologies and AI-enabled tools, in order to enable legislatures to innovate and equitably benefit from technological advancements.

16. We reiterate our commitment to achieving universal and meaningful connectivity for all and encourage collaborative efforts to facilitate the deployment of digital infrastructure, including digital public infrastructure, to facilitate economic development, social inclusion, improved public service delivery, and enhance resilience and innovation. In this regard, we note the proposal to launch the digital public infrastructure repository for BRICS countries and pilot projects of digital public infrastructure solutions for digital transformation for BRICS countries. 4

17. We reaffirm our commitment to reforming global governance by promoting a more just, equitable, agile, effective, efficient, responsive, representative, legitimate, democratic and accountable international and multilateral system in the spirit of extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits. We acknowledge that multipolarity and multilateralism can expand opportunities for Emerging Markets and Developing Countries (EMDCs) to realise their potential and enjoy universally beneficial, inclusive, sustainable and equitable economic globalization and cooperation. We highlight the importance of the Global South as a driver for positive change and reaffirm the role of BRICS in voicing its concerns and priorities, including through voluntary development cooperation and capacity-building.

18. We emphasize the contribution of parliamentary diplomacy, inter-parliamentary dialogue and cooperation to advancing a more representative and inclusive global governance architecture, within the respective constitutional mandates and competencies of member Parliaments.

19. We reiterate our commitment to the strengthening of multilateralism and upholding the international law, including the Purposes and Principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, which serve as its indispensable cornerstone. We emphasise the central role of the UN in an international system where sovereign states cooperate to maintain international peace and security, advance sustainable development, ensure the promotion and protection of democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, and foster cooperation based on solidarity, mutual respect, justice and sovereign equality while respecting national circumstances, diversity of national systems and development pathways, consistent with states’ obligations under international law with the aim to build a brighter shared future for the international community based on mutually beneficial cooperation.

20. We stress the urgency of reforming the current international peace and security architecture, which necessarily requires the strengthening of multilateralism, and support a comprehensive reform of the United Nations, including its Security Council. This reform should make it more just, equitable, democratic, representative, effective, and efficient, better reflecting contemporary realities and the needs of the international community. In this regard, we welcome the statement at Paragraph 13 of the BRICS New Delhi Declaration 2026.

21. We strongly condemn all violations of international humanitarian law, including deliberate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, including in BRICS Member States, as well as the denial or obstruction of humanitarian access and the targeting of humanitarian personnel. In this regard, we take note of Paragraph 29 of the BRICS New Delhi Declaration 2026. We underline the need to address accountability for all violations of international humanitarian law. We recognize international efforts undertaken by BRICS members to promote respect for, adherence to, and effective implementation of international humanitarian law.

22. We express deep concern over the continued escalation of tensions in Middle East/West Asia and, recalling our respective national positions, call for exercising maximum restraint, as well as avoiding actions that could further aggravate the situation. Furthermore, we urge to ensure 5 the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations in their entirety and interconnectedness, including respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the States. We encourage increasing efforts, through dialogue and diplomacy, towards a long-term understanding that will contribute to lasting peace, security and stability in the region. We stress the need to work together to maintain smooth flow of global trade, supply chains and energy, in accordance with applicable international law.

23. We condemn the imposition of unilateral coercive measures that are contrary to international law, and reiterate that such measures, inter alia in the form of unilateral economic sanctions and secondary sanctions, have far reaching negative implications on human rights, including the right to development, health and food security of the general population of targeted states. We call for the elimination of such unlawful measures which undermine international law and the principles and purposes of the UN Charter.

24. We express strong condemnation of any acts of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, whenever, wherever and by whomsoever committed. We condemn in the strongest terms the terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir on 22 April 2025, during which 26 people were killed and many more injured. We reaffirm our commitment to combating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, including the cross-border movement of terrorists, terrorism financing and safe havens. We reiterate that terrorism should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group and that all those involved in terrorist activities and their support must be held accountable and brought to justice in accordance with relevant national and international law. We urge to ensure zero tolerance for terrorism and reject double standards in countering terrorism. We emphasize the primary responsibility of States in combating terrorism and that global efforts to prevent and counter terrorist threats must fully comply with their obligations under international law, including the Charter of the UN, in particular the purposes and principles thereof, and relevant international conventions and protocols, in particular international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law, as applicable. We welcome the activities of the BRICS Counter-Terrorism Working Group (CTWG) and its five Subgroups based upon the BRICS Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the BRICS Counter-Terrorism Action Plan and the CTWG Position Paper. We look forward to further deepening counter-terrorism cooperation. We call for an expeditious finalization and adoption of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism in the UN framework. We call for concerted actions against all UN designated terrorists and terrorist entities.

25. We reaffirm our unwavering support for the peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on the two-state solution, with the two States living side by side, in peace and security, in accordance with international law and relevant United Nations resolutions, asserting the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, freedom, and an independent, sovereign State. 6

26. We recognize that training and capacity building are crucial for fostering effective inter-parliamentary cooperation. Therefore, we encourage the promotion of exchange of experiences, knowledge sharing and collaboration among parliamentarians and their technical and legislative advisors for capacity building and professional networking.

27. We take note of Russia’s proposal to consider establishing an inter-parliamentary BRICS Working Group on Sport, in line with Paragraph 8 of the Protocol to the Memorandum of Understanding on the BRICS Parliamentary Forum of 11 July 2024, which could provide a platform for the voluntary exchange of experience and best practices in the field of sport and physical education, in accordance with national laws and priorities.

28. On the 10th Anniversary of the BRICS Women’s Parliamentarians Forum, we recall the Jaipur Declaration of 2016, which called for the institutionalisation of this meeting as an annual event to promote more inclusive inter-parliamentary deliberations. We further encourage the strengthening of inter-parliamentary interaction through meetings of the Chairpersons of the International Affairs Committees of BRICS Parliaments, which contribute to deepening mutual understanding and facilitating the exchange of experiences and legislative best practices.

29. We congratulate the Parliament of India for the successful hosting of the 12th BRICS Parliamentary Forum and express our sincere gratitude for the hospitality extended by the Parliament and the People of India.

30. We look forward to reconvening in 2027 under the BRICS Chairship of the People’s Republic of China. ****

South Africa
Source: www.sanews.gov.za

South Africa will participate in the 12th Annual BRICS Astronomy Working Group (BAWG) Meeting in India, to strengthen scientific collaboration and advance joint research priorities among BRICS member countries.
The meeting will take place from 26 to 30 October 2026 and will focus on multi-messenger and multi-wavelength transients, while exploring opportunities for research collaboration, skills development and public engagement in astronomy.

The Department of Science, Technology and Innovation’s Chief Director of Astronomy, Takalani Nemaungani, will lead South Africa’s 17-member delegation, which includes representatives from the South African Astronomical Observatory, the South African Radio Astronomy Observatory, the University of Cape Town, the University of the Western Cape, the Inter-University Institute for Data Intensive Astronomy and the University of Johannesburg.

The delegation will participate in presentations on the state of astronomy in BRICS member countries, highlighting scientific developments, strategic priorities and policy perspectives.

The discussions are expected to assist in informing collective planning and provide an opportunity to identify shared challenges and opportunities across the BRICS astronomy community.

“Their participation highlights South Africa’s contribution to the Working Group and the role of national research institutions and universities in advancing collaborative astronomy,” the National Research Foundation (NRF) said in a statement.

At the meeting, researchers, government representatives, educators and science communicators will review progress on existing initiatives, strengthen partnerships and identify new opportunities for cooperation in astronomy research and technology development.

The programme will also include the BAWG Data Science Hackathon, organised in collaboration with the Aryabhatta Research Institute of Observational Sciences and the Indian Space Research Organisation.
Other activities will include science communication training, the launch of the BRICS Astronomy Robotics and Coding Training initiative and a public exhibition showcasing astronomy facilities across BRICS countries.
Furthermore, discussions will cover research, technology development, education, data science, human capital development and public engagement.

For South Africa, these engagements are important for strengthening the national astronomy landscape, connecting local expertise with international research networks, while supporting the development of skills, innovation and public engagement.

“By bringing together scientific research, policy dialogue, capacity building and public engagement, the BAWG reinforces astronomy’s contribution to scientific advancement and sustainable development across BRICS countries.”

About the BAWG

The BRICS Astronomy Working Group was established in 2015 to promote cooperation among member countries in astronomy research, technology development and capacity building.
Its flagship initiative, the BRICS Intelligent Telescope and Data Network (BITDN), supports long-term collaboration through shared research infrastructure and data capabilities.
The working group aims to strengthen astronomy research and innovation while advancing scientific cooperation and skills development across BRICS countries. – SAnews.gov.za

Egypt
Source: egyptian-gazette.com

BRICS’s role in reshaping the global order took centre stage at the opening session of the Cairo Forum 3, which started in Cairo on Sunday, for two days, with high-level participation from representatives and officials of more than 30 countries, alongside a number of leading international institutions and organisations.

The forum is set to discuss the latest rapid developments in the regional and international economic and geopolitical landscapes.

International experts debated in the session whether the bloc could drive a transition towards a multipolar world or provide a viable alternative amid growing global fragmentation.

The session, entitled “The New World, The Old Crisis: Is BRICS the Transition Engine to a Fragmented Substitute?”, was moderated by Abla Abdel Latif, Executive Director and Head of Research at the Egyptian Centre for Economic Studies (ECES).

Dialogue over conflict

This year is pivotal for the bloc for three reasons, topped with the return of the G20 presidency to the US after years of presidencies by Global South countries, leaving BRICS to carry discussions that Washington was unwilling to take up, President of India’s Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Samir Saran, said.

In addition, conflicts have multiplied worldwide, some involving BRICS members themselves, yet New Delhi secured a 14-paragraph consensus statement, and development, battered since the pandemic, returned to the agenda.

New Delhi, Saran said, chose to deepen the bloc’s work rather than expand it, proposing a troika arrangement to ensure continuity between summits.

Key outcomes included an institutional framework for food security and early warning, a startup incubation programme awaiting a dedicated fund, and a commitment to strengthen the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement. India also held 400 meetings across 30 cities. “All eyes on Beijing,” he said, hoping China will carry these outcomes forward, he added.
A new equilibrium

Founder and president of the Center for China and Globalisation (CCG), Henry Huiyao Wang, told the session that BRICS ‘reflects the rise of the Global South and a shift from a unipolar to a multipolar world’.
Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) remain of prime importance but need reform, and that new bodies such as the New Development Bank (NDB) and the sian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) show the way, he added.

He also called for a greater Global South role in stabilising regional conflicts, noting that China is the largest trading partner of the Gulf and Middle East while India has the largest diaspora there, and welcomed the emergence of BRICS payment systems as an alternative to reliance on a single currency.

Beijing, he said, sees the Global South as a natural partner, drawing on four decades of development experience in infrastructure, education and health. He described China as playing a stabilising role, calling for a return to economic fundamentals alongside a strategic balance that keeps conflicts under control.

Culture of dialogue
BRICS presents a new model of international relations. Its expansion brought more points of tension without making it weaker, she argued, because members retain a culture of dialogue, Head of Russia’s BRICS Expert Council, Victoria Panova, said.

The bloc is building a financial ecosystem, including clearing, insurance and payment mechanisms, and moving bilateral arrangements to the multilateral level, Panova added.

She acknowledged that the bloc ‘has no unified proposal yet on global governance reform. Yet, she agrees the current system cannot continue.

Panova stressed that BRICS has a positive agenda and tolerates diversified diplomacy, citing Indonesia, its newest member, which still seeks to join the OECD. The NDB, she noted, was set up within two and a half years of the idea being raised.

Global South’s own conversation
President Emeritus Centre for Global Development, Masood Ahmed, told the session that BRICS had begun as a reaction to an order that gave emerging powers too little say.

The rules-based order is still the dominant framework, he argued, but more countries are now exploring how to amend it, he added.

BRICS is the forum where the Global South can set out its views, and it need not adopt a single vision.
He also pointed to the difference between the NDB and AIIB models on conditionality and co-operation with existing institutions, as a question for reforming the World Bank and regional banks.

In his view, the G7 will focus on its own perspective, BRICS on the Global South’s, and the G20 should ideally be where the two meet, he noted.

Egypt
Source: en.amwalalghad.com

Egypt is studying the development of a logistics hub for grains and vegetable oils with potential participation from BRICS investors, Supply Minister Sherif Farouk said Wednesday, as the country seeks to expand food-sector partnerships and increase exports to Russia.

The proposed hub would combine trading, storage, and food processing activities, Farouk said during a session at the Russia-Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum in Moscow.

BRICS investors could contribute capital, expertise, and trade networks to the project, he said. Its location and investment structure would be determined through technical and economic studies to meet domestic needs and strengthen Egypt’s role in regional food trade.

Investment opportunities extend to several locations across Egypt and are not limited to the Russian industrial zone in the Suez Canal Economic Zone (SCZONE), Farouk said. The choice of location for each project would depend on its requirements, including access to ports, available services, and proximity to suppliers and markets.

Farouk described the Russian industrial zone as an opportunity to deepen economic ties through investment, production, and trade. He stressed the importance of coordination with relevant authorities, clear timelines for bringing projects into operation, and stronger links with Egyptian suppliers.

The ministry sees opportunities to expand cooperation with Russia and other BRICS members in food processing, storage, logistics, and distribution, Farouk said, adding that such partnerships could support trade and investment.

Egypt is also seeking to expand its exports to the Russian market. Reliable shipping services, efficient payment arrangements, and stronger direct commercial partnerships would help support broader and more balanced bilateral trade, he said.

BRICS could help connect investors, companies, and financial institutions with these opportunities and explore suitable financing and payment options to support trade and investment, Farouk added.
The government’s shared objective is to turn cooperation opportunities into operational projects, increase trade, and deliver sustainable economic benefits, he said.

Egypt aims to increase grain silo storage capacity to 6 million tons by 2030, up from 4.4 million tons in 2026, Supply and Internal Trade Minister Sherif Farouk said during a Senate plenary session on Tuesday.

Farouk said strategic reserves of essential commodities cover approximately six months of consumption on average. At the same time, local wheat procurement reached around 5 million tons during the 2026 season, up from more than 4 million tons in 2025. The ministry targets a 20 per cent annual increase in local procurement to achieve self-sufficiency in subsidised wheat by 2030.

The ministry relies on around 40,000 distribution outlets and 30,000 subsidised bakeries to supply more than 30 essential commodities to approximately 57.5 million beneficiaries monthly. It is also implementing the national Carry On project to modernise outlets and improve distribution efficiency.

To curb rising prices, the ministry aims to offer 30 essential commodities at discounts of up to 25 per cent. The initiative has covered 190 districts through 284 outlets, while nearly 600 one-day markets have opened in three phases. The ministry is also deploying 267 mobile sales vehicles to underserved areas.

Farouk said market monitoring campaigns cover mills, bakeries, commodity outlets, markets, fuel stations and butane gas depots. The ministry is also using digital tools to track prices and complaints and developing a mechanism to link wholesale and retail prices to identify and address unjustified increases.

Malaysia
Source: www.thestar.com.my

KUALA LUMPUR: Malaysia's trade with BRICS member countries surged 20% to RM481.02bil in the first half of the year, as the government looks to the emerging economies bloc to expand export markets, attract high-value investments and reduce reliance on traditional trading partners.

Deputy Foreign Minister Datuk Lukanisman Awang Sauni said the figure marked a significant increase from RM400.73bil in the corresponding period last year.

He said exports to BRICS countries rose 17.4% to RM181.40bil, compared with RM154.57bil previously, while imports increased 21.7% to RM299.62bil from RM246.15bil.

"China, Indonesia and India remain Malaysia's largest trading partners within BRICS, accounting for approximately 90% of total trade," he told the Dewan Rakyat on Thursday (Oct 29).

Lukanisman said Malaysia's total trade with BRICS countries reached RM846.05bil last year, an increase of 3.4% from RM818.04bil in 2024.

The bloc accounted for 27.7% of Malaysia's total global trade last year, he added.

He said Malaysia's participation as a BRICS partner country was guided by a neutral, pragmatic and principled foreign policy, with economic diversification among its central objectives.

"Our main objectives are to diversify strategic economic partners and reduce dependence solely on traditional markets, champion the Global South agenda and support reforms of multilateral institutions to make them more equitable and inclusive," he said.

Lukanisman said the BRICS framework would also provide Malaysia with opportunities to penetrate markets where it currently has no free trade agreements (FTAs).

"BRICS serves as an important platform for expanding export destinations and entering markets where Malaysia does not yet have FTAs, including Brazil, Russia, South Africa, Ethiopia, Iran and Egypt," he said.
He added that cooperation within the bloc would complement Malaysia's existing bilateral arrangements and trade agreements rather than replace them.

The government is also looking to strengthen the use of local currencies in trade settlements, including the ringgit-renminbi arrangement, to reduce transaction costs and exposure to foreign exchange fluctuations.
"Cooperation through BRICS encourages the use of local currencies and more efficient cross-border payment systems, thereby reducing transaction costs and risks arising from fluctuations in intermediary foreign currencies such as the US dollar," he said.

Lukanisman said the government was prioritising strategic sectors aligned with the Madani Economy framework, the New Industrial Master Plan 2030 (NIMP 2030) and the National Energy Transition Roadmap (NETR).

"The focus is on increasing exports of electrical and electronics products, semiconductors and palm oil, alongside attracting investments in emerging technologies such as green technology and cybersecurity to strengthen the domestic innovation ecosystem," he said.

He added that Malaysia also sought to strengthen food and energy supply chain resilience through agricultural cooperation and renewable energy projects.

He said efforts would also be directed towards expanding high-value services, including tourism, education, healthcare and Islamic finance, across BRICS markets.

"BRICS also provides a platform to bring together major markets to address practical trade issues, including trade facilitation, logistics connectivity, trade digitalisation and supply chain resilience.

"It opens up opportunities to attract high-quality investments and technology transfers in strategic sectors such as semiconductors, AI and digital infrastructure," he said.

Datuk Seri Dr Ronald Kiandee (PN-Beluran) wanted to know Malaysia's objectives in joining BRICS as a partner country, its advantages over existing trade agreements, and the priority markets and sectors targeted for trade expansion.

USA
Source: www.reuters.com

LONDON, Oct 30 (Reuters) - BRICS+ countries should press ahead with a joint cross-border payments mechanism to reduce reliance on the US dollar, but a shared currency would face major economic ​and institutional obstacles, a think tank report said on Friday.

The paper, published ‌by non-profit policy platform BRICS+ Thinking, urged the expanded grouping of major emerging economies led by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa to commit to such a mechanism and take the steps ​needed to make it work.

"It is absolutely crucial that their central banks embrace ​this goal and make sure that all the technical requirements are put ⁠in place to allow this mechanism to function," said authors Gregory T. Chin, Danny ​Quah and Jim O'Neill, the former Goldman Sachs economist who coined the BRICS acronym.
Cross-border payments ​have long been on the BRICS agenda, though efforts to integrate members' financial infrastructure have made limited progress.

In a declaration issued after their September summit in India, BRICS leaders said they would continue ​work on faster, cheaper cross-border payments, including by linking payment systems and increasing the ​use of local currencies.

Introducing a shared currency, meanwhile, would require "dramatic reforms" across the group, including greater central ‌bank ⁠independence, a common monetary authority and fewer restrictions on capital flows.

"The initial prognosis for the possibility of a BRICS+ currency is not hopeful," the authors said, adding that it would have to be freely convertible both domestically and internationally, a difficult requirement under current ​policies.

"This is daunting enough ​but further significant ⁠challenges include how these countries are geographically dispersed and how they show no enthusiasm for delegating policy autonomy to a common central ​bank."
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The prospect of a BRICS currency has drawn criticism from US ​President Donald ⁠Trump, who has repeatedly threatened 100% tariffs on member states if they create a common currency or back an alternative to the US dollar.

BRICS does not have a common currency, ⁠and members ​including Russia and India have played down the prospect. ​However, efforts to reduce reliance on the dollar have gathered pace globally since Western sanctions were imposed on ​Russia following its 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Thailand
Source: oananews.org

KUALA LUMPUR, Oct 29 (Bernama) -- Malaysia’s total trade with BRICS member countries reached RM846.5 billion (US$1=RM4.06) in 2025, up 3.4 per cent from RM818.04 billion in 2024, and accounted for 27.7 per cent of the country’s total global trade.

Deputy Foreign Minister Lukanisman Awang Sauni said that from January to June 2026, Malaysia’s trade with BRICS member countries rose 20.0 per cent to RM481.02 billion, compared with RM400.73 billion for the same period in 2025.

“Export value increased by 17.4 per cent to RM181.40 billion from RM154.57 billion in the previous year.

“Meanwhile, the value of imports also increased by 21.7 per cent to RM299.62 billion, compared to RM246.15 billion for the same period in 2025,” he said during today’s question-and-answer session in the Dewan Rakyat (Parliament).

Lukanisman was responding to a member of Parliament on the objectives of Malaysia’s participation as a BRICS Partner Country, the added value compared to existing bilateral cooperation and trade agreements with its member countries, as well as the markets and sectors prioritised to expand Malaysia’s trade through the BRICS framework.

He said China, Indonesia, and India remain Malaysia’s largest BRICS trading partners, contributing about 90 per cent of total trade.

“Through the BRICS framework, Malaysia prioritises market expansion and strategic sectors aligned with the aspirations of the MADANI Economy, including the New Industrial Master Plan (NIMP 2030) and the National Energy Transition Roadmap (NETR).

“This step focuses on efforts to increase the export of Electrical & Electronics (E&E) goods, semiconductors, and palm oil, while attracting investments in new technologies such as green technology and cybersecurity to strengthen the local innovation ecosystem,” he said.

In addition, Lukanisman said focus is also given to strengthening the resilience of food and energy supply chains through collaboration in the agricultural sector and renewable energy transition projects.

“This effort is coupled with steps to expand the market for value-added service sectors such as tourism, education, healthcare, and promoting Malaysia’s expertise in Islamic finance to BRICS countries,” he said.

The deputy minister said Malaysia’s participation as a BRICS Partner Country is based on a foreign policy that is neutral, pragmatic, and principled.

He said that Malaysia’s participation as a BRICS Partner Country is to diversify economic strategic partners and reduce dependence solely on traditional markets; to advocate for the Global South agenda to ensure that the voices of developing countries are more accepted in international economic and financial governance; and to support the reform of multilateral institutions to be more equitable, inclusive, and reflective of the current geopolitical reality.

Lukanisman said cooperation through the BRICS framework adds significant value and complements existing bilateral cooperation mechanisms and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs).

“BRICS, among other things, expands the diversity of export destinations and becomes an important platform for penetrating markets that do not yet have an FTA with Malaysia, such as Brazil, Russia, South Africa, Ethiopia, Iran, and Egypt.

“This is in addition to promoting the use of local currencies (such as the strengthening of the ringgit-renminbi) and more efficient cross-border payment systems, thereby reducing transaction costs and the risk of fluctuations in intermediary foreign exchange rates (such as with the US dollar).

“Additionally, providing a platform to consolidate key markets to address practical trade issues simultaneously, including trade facilitation, logistics connectivity, trade digitalisation, and supply chain resilience; as well as creating opportunities for attracting high-quality investments and technology transfers in strategic sectors such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI), and digital infrastructure,” he added.
-- BERNAMA