India
Source: www.indianarrative.com

Geopolitics is unpredictable. The ongoing trajectory of China-India relations offers a clear pattern of strategic convergence towards accommodating coexistence without abandoning their fundamental interests. Neither Beijing nor New Delhi subscribes to undoing their disagreements, particularly over the border and regional influence. Yet, both are looking for selective engagement as a prelude to strategic outreach.

Chinese President Xi Jinping attended a meeting in New Delhi for the BRICS Summit on 12–13 September 2026 with Indian Prime Minister Modi. The sharing of the table and the timing signified the changing geopolitical environment of the East. After the 2020 conflict, India-China relations witnessed a period of strain. Despite this, the two Asian neighbours represented a common voice for the Global South together, even during the post-2020 conflict.

Last month, the 26th SCO Summit, 2026, was held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, where the leaders of both India and China interacted with each other. The episode was well articulated, followed by Doval-Wang talks on eight consensuses between China and India: substantial progress on boundary delimitation, greater facilitation of the Kailash-Mansarovar Yatra, easier visa applications, peace on the frontier, restoration of direct flight connections, establishment of more communication hotlines, and rebuilding and resuming trade networks. Although the summit provides no evidence to claim good ties between India and China, it offers a better outlook for common interests in the SCO.

Interestingly, the first-ever China-India bilateral commanders’ interaction on 6 September at the Arunachal border was a positive outcome after the Bishkek Resolution.

Why does Washington have its eyes on it?

This is where developments between China and India become uncomfortable for Washington. The swift grouping of BRICS has emerged as considerably more important since its inception.

For Washington, the exorbitant factor lies in three parameters. First, the presence of Russia at the epicenter could stretch its tangible regional influence, as it has already formed a stronger Russia-China-India nexus of global cooperation. Second, Washington has heavily invested in India as an important geostrategic partner in the Indo-Pacific region to counter Beijing’s footprint. Perhaps India acknowledges the partnership with the U.S. but has resisted joining an alliance framework. The changing atmosphere of India-China relations could reduce U.S. intensity in the region and twist the prism or shuffle the cards for the U.S. in Asia.

Third, China’s whirlwind presence in regional influence comes straightforwardly. President Xi Jinping has created a diplomatic blitz of travel in recent years. Again, the U.S. introduction of a “final and conclusive” decision to impose 25% tariffs at unjustifiable rates was directed against several states, alongside the escalation of the U.S.-Israel confrontation with Iran (a BRICS member), which later erupted into energy insecurity and wider implications for regional dynamics. With the rare show of China-India firmness standing together against the U.S., the heat from the West begins. This turmoil puts a veiled spotlight on the vulnerabilities of a global system heavily dependent on a dollar-oriented financial architecture.

This brings us to U.S. President Donald Trump, who has repeatedly warned BRICS countries that their policies to alter the dominance of the U.S. dollar could result in 100% tariffs if member countries attempt de-dollarisation. But what is often missed is an understanding of India’s intention: support for the greater use of national currencies and digital-payment mechanisms, while stating that the dollar is strong but is not the sole option for transactions.

Russia and China, two seats in the same vehicle, support an alternative payment mechanism to the dollar that would reduce dependency on Western financial channels and accelerate the use of the ruble-yuan mechanism to develop financial infrastructure while bolstering the debt market.

The logic is simple and precise. New Delhi does not want any notion of permanent hostility in its relations with Beijing. A stable border would redefine the strategic outline for India to concentrate on technocratic investment, farming, economic development, maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, neighbouring countries, and a wider range of collaborative entities with Southeast and Central Asia.
India looks at strategic autonomy and national interests as two prime factors of proportional engagement. India looks to China for capital investment, technology, and resource sharing as important instruments for New Delhi’s supply security. India, indeed good at pharmaceuticals and engineering, seeks relations the other way as well. Beijing’s investments often open doors for employment and opportunities, creating a quality-job-oriented market rather than tilting towards heavy dependency.

Meanwhile, China too has an incentive to prevent ties from deteriorating further. Beijing holds strong relations with Russia, Central Asia, and the Middle East, as well as a strategic presence in the West and Southeast Asia. The rise of multipolarity, shaped by China, shows strength through economic and military presence. Maintaining a relatively stable relationship with India would reduce the possibility of strategic pressure from the Pacific end while providing substantial space for manoeuvre in the China-India itinerary, as well as scope for building a network of global partners.

The time has come when maintaining warm relations with India is highly valued, with Beijing interested in restoring relations with India. In parallel, India’s trade deficit with China has always been a central point of discussion. New Delhi’s cautious restrictions on Chinese investment and the shadow of the ‘Five Palm Theory’ appear as a realm of mistrust, depicting both countries as ‘two neighbours—too suspicious’. This explains why the current India-China engagement should not be interpreted as an absence of confrontation, but is better understood as an attempt at plausible rivalry.

The BRICS Summit itself is a diplomatic test for India: either it works or works against it. The relevance of China-India relations lies in a prime approach of ‘Mutual Strategic Pragmatism’.

Resilience would require peace on the border, trusted military communication, and improving socio-economic ties, particularly on the issue of the trade deficit. Diplomacy is the green light for China-India relations, helping to prevent any unwanted conflict.

This spring brought an opportunity for the two Asian powers to look towards positive measures for coexistence. If they succeed, it may give Washington and Western powers sleepless nights, forcing them to rethink the choice between gradual dependence and a more appropriate interdependence.

Ghana
Source: www.myjoyonline.com

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa, has clarified that Ghana is not seeking full membership of BRICS, but intends to apply as a Partner Country.

In an interview on TV3's Key Points on Saturday, October 10, the Minister explained that Ghana already enjoys excellent relations with BRICS member countries and will be joining natural allies in what is arguably the largest trading bloc today.

He stressed that at the heart of the decision is the desire to seek the national interest first, as enshrined in Article 40 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.

The Minister noted that BRICS brings together eleven major emerging markets and developing countries: Brazil, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates. It will therefore serve as a useful platform for consultation and cooperation on contemporary issues having global and regional significance.

Mr Ablakwa dispelled fears that the decision will affect Ghana's relations with its traditional partner countries. He explained that, on the contrary, the decision affirms Ghana's policy of non-alignment, which enabled President Kwame Nkrumah, at the height of the Cold War, to secure support from the United States to build the Akosombo Dam while also getting the then Soviet Union to launch Africa's pioneering atomic energy programme.

He further disclosed that prior to the announcement, there were engagements with European Union member states, and Ghana was clear in communicating the rationale for its decision, which was within its right to diversify strategic options for development.

Background

BRIC was formalised at the first meeting of BRIC Foreign Ministers on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York in 2006.

The inaugural BRIC Summit was convened in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in 2009. It was agreed to expand BRIC into BRICS with the inclusion of South Africa in 2010.

Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE became full members from January 2024, and Indonesia in January 2025. Belarus, Bolivia, Kazakhstan, Cuba, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam joined BRICS as Partner Countries in 2025. Ghana will therefore become part of these countries, in terms of status, if its bid succeeds.

India
Source: www.nextias.com

Context

• India’s 2026 BRICS chairship has renewed debate over unilateral climate-linked trade measures, especially the EU’s CBAM, and the need for common carbon-accounting standards.

About Climate Agenda & Global Trade

• Climate policy and international trade are increasingly inseparable.
• Environmental regulation can directly affect market access, competitiveness and global supply chains as countries impose carbon prices, deforestation rules, sustainability due diligence and product-level emissions standards.
• For BRICS economies pursuing rapid industrialisation while reducing emissions intensity, fragmented climate-trade rules pose a particular challenge.
• The principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) recognises differences in countries’ historical responsibility and developmental capacities.

BRICS Climate Agenda for Rules-Based Cooperation

• The BRICS Declaration (2026) reiterates familiar positions on the UNFCCC, Paris Agreement, CBDR-RC, climate finance, biodiversity, forests and opposition to unilateral climate measures.
• However, extensive repetition of earlier declarations risks diverting attention from operational deliverables.
• The Declaration recognises traditional knowledge, indigenous and local practices and community experience (people-centric and community-based adaptation), an important approach for countries such as India, Brazil and China, where traditional ecological knowledge remains significant.
• BRICS can build on this by moving from declarations to common methodologies, mutual recognition and technical cooperation.

Unilateral Climate Measures and Protectionism: EU & BRICS

• BRICS has objected to unilateral climate-related trade measures that may become discriminatory or protectionist.
• The Rio Declaration (2025) specifically highlighted concerns regarding deforestation regulation, due-diligence requirements, taxes and other unilateral measures.
• The EU’s Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) and sustainability due-diligence requirements illustrate the trend towards embedding environmental compliance deep into supply chains.
• For exporters, this creates demands for traceability, documentation, verification and emissions data.
• The challenge is to distinguish legitimate climate action from measures that impose disproportionate costs on developing-country producers.

Why Does Carbon Accounting Matters?

• Carbon accounting is the missing link in the BRICS climate-trade agenda.
• The Rio Declaration (2025) had proposed mutually recognised methodologies and standards for assessing greenhouse-gas emissions and welcomed principles for fair, inclusive and transparent carbon accounting in product and facility footprints.
• It is crucial because different jurisdictions may calculate the embodied emissions of the same product differently.
• Such fragmentation can result in different carbon values for identical goods, creating uncertainty and compliance costs for exporters.
• A common BRICS framework could establish comparable rules for:
• system boundaries and emissions scopes;
• treatment of precursor or embedded emissions;
• verification and certification;
• missing or incomplete data; and
• mutual recognition of methodologies.

Cap-and-Trade: One Size Does Not Fit All

• Conventional cap-and-trade systems, developed around scarcity of emissions allowances in advanced economies, cannot simply be transplanted into developing economies whose simultaneous challenge is to expand production and reduce emissions intensity.
• India’s Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS) illustrates an alternative, intensity-oriented approach.
• Recognition of qualifying domestic carbon-pricing mechanisms can potentially reduce duplication, but exporters still need to establish emissions data, system boundaries and independent verification.
• Therefore, climate cooperation should recognise equivalent outcomes rather than impose identical policy architectures.

CBAM and India’s Export Challenge

• The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) entered its definitive phase in January 2026.
• Initially covering sectors including iron and steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers, electricity and hydrogen, it links import obligations to embedded emissions.
• For Indian exporters, the concern is not merely the carbon price but the compliance ecosystem surrounding it.
• Smaller firms may face substantial costs in monitoring, reporting and third-party verification.
• The proposed expansion of CBAM product coverage could further increase exposure of Indian exports, particularly in steel and aluminium.
• Thus, India needs both domestic carbon-market capacity and international negotiations on recognition of its methodologies.

Way Forward for BRICS

• BRICS should use COP31 and other multilateral forums to build a cooperative alternative to fragmented climate-trade regulation.
• Operationalise the BRICS carbon-accounting principles sector by sector.
• Establish mutual recognition of emissions data and verification systems.
• Develop equivalence frameworks between different carbon-pricing mechanisms.
• Create technical assistance for MSMEs and developing-country exporters.
• Ensure climate-trade measures remain consistent with Paris Agreement principles, CBDR-RC and WTO rules.
• Link adaptation cooperation with traditional knowledge and community-based practices.

Conclusion

• BRICS can either remain a platform for repeatedly articulating opposition to unilateral climate measures or become a rule-making coalition for the Global South.
• A credible, transparent and mutually recognised carbon-accounting framework would allow BRICS to reconcile climate ambition with development, competitiveness and a fairer global trading system.

USA
Source: www.reuters.com

SAO PAULO/BRASILIA, Oct 9 (Reuters) - Two starkly different visions for US-Brazil relations hang in the balance in Brazil’s presidential runoff, but the strategies of both Senator Flavio Bolsonaro and incumbent President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva come with their own risks, experts said.

Bolsonaro heads toward the October 25 runoff with momentum after ​he secured 47% of the first-round vote to Lula’s 45%, following a campaign where both candidates’ relationships with Washington drew scrutiny.

The stakes ‌are high. Brazil’s next president will have to navigate tensions between its first- and second-largest trading partners — China and the US — while shaping strategies on mineral development, industrialization, and regional cooperation.

Brazil and the US established a working group last month to drive negotiations over tariffs and a broader bilateral trade framework, with US access to Brazil's critical minerals and rare earths emerging as a key ​point of contention as Washington looks to reduce its dependence on China for those minerals.

If the challenger wins, "the Americans may prove reluctant to yield anything ​to Lula, preferring to wait and negotiate with Bolsonaro," said Rubens Barbosa, a former Brazilian ambassador to the US.
Lula's strategy toward ⁠the US has focused on defending Brazil's sovereignty after US President Donald Trump heaped pressure on Brazil to drop charges against Bolsonaro's father, former President Jair Bolsonaro, ​who is now serving a 27-year sentence for trying to plot a coup.

A nationalist tone has framed Lula's engagement with Washington, while he prioritizes multilateralism and closer ties ​with the Global South, including the BRICS bloc, which includes Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, among other countries.

Though the approach helped his popularity at home, the leftist has enjoyed checkered progress in negotiations with Washington, experts told Reuters.

If Lula manages to win reelection, an incoming Congress dominated by right-wing parties could push a "weaker Lula" to change tack, said Monica de Bolle, a ​senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington.

"I believe there would be a lot of pressure on Lula to give in to some US ​demands regarding natural resources, as well as other issues," said de Bolle.

BOLSONARO’S GAMBLES

While "Lula has a well-established foreign policy," said Rubens Ricupero, a former Brazilian diplomat who served in the US ‌and Europe, Bolsonaro's ⁠is a "blank slate."

The senator has a friendly relationship with the Trump administration, aided by his brother Eduardo Bolsonaro, a former Brazilian congressman who has resided in the US since early last year and was convicted by Brazil's Supreme Court for inviting US intervention in their father's legal proceedings in 2025.

While neither brother has confirmed the rumors, a person close to the campaign told Reuters that the two have been discussing potential international roles for the younger sibling if the senator becomes Brazil's next president.

If Bolsonaro ​is elected president "there would be a foreign ​policy much more aligned with the ⁠United States than Brazil traditionally has had,” said de Bolle.

The family's close ties to the Trump administration could secure a more favorable negotiating environment with Washington, though Bolsonaro risks making concessions on key issues like strategic minerals, experts said.

"The path seems clear ​for good agreements," but Bolsonaro would face questions from supporters about Brazil's autonomy from the US and "more pressure to maintain an independent ​narrative," said Jean Castro, ⁠president of the Brazilian Association of Institutional and Governmental Relations.
Since launching his campaign, Bolsonaro has courted Trump, as well as other right-wing allies abroad like Argentina’s Javier Milei and Colombia’s Abelardo de la Espriella.

Bolsonaro and Trump have already aligned on strategy for combating organized crime. Visiting Washington in May, he urged Trump to designate major Brazilian criminal factions ⁠as Foreign ​Terrorist Organizations, a proposal Washington accepted but which Lula flatly rejected as intervention. Lula instead advocated for a national ​approach to address security with international cooperation.

Public opinion polls have shown Lula’s popularity got a bump from his frequent disagreements with Trump on trade and security, while other surveys showed Brazilians held Bolsonaro more responsible for tariffs imposed ​by Trump in July.

"He cannot adopt a stance that could be mistaken for subservience," said Castro.

Reporting by Luciana Magalhaes; Editing by Brendan O'Boyle, Oliver Griffin and Aurora Ellis

Russia
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org

The quest for BRICS continuity

After the BRICS summit in September of 2026 the emphasis placed by India’s chairmanship on ensuring greater continuity in the bloc’s initiatives from one presidency to the other appears to have been broadly supported by observers and experts from across the Global South. The BRICS Continuity Mechanism advanced by Prime Minister Modi is predicated on a combination of a BRICS Troika mechanism (past, current and future presidency) as well as a secure digital repository to track decisions. The main rationale behind this proposal was the significant rise in the number of the BRICS core members, with further expansion put on hold due to the need to ensure greater integration of new members. A look, however, at the potential scenarios of the upcoming succession of BRICS presidencies suggests that there may be far more to the need for the BRICS Continuity Mechanism than readily meets the eye.

On the surface, the expansion in BRICS membership increases the urgency of continuity mechanisms in order to bring new members up to speed on the workings of the grouping and the various coordination mechanisms and procedures used in its operation. Another factor in this respect is that the duration of the policy cycles after the bloc’s expansion effectively increases nearly two-fold – if in the past China’s policy impulses such as the BRICS+ format took 5 years to make the full-circle before its re-launching in 2022, this policy lag now expands to 10 years, which raises the need for both greater ambition (strength of the initial policy impulse) as well as greater continuity and policy coordination in driving this policy impulse to the next BRICS cycle.

That in itself seems to be sufficient to warrant a full-fledged continuity mechanism to be instituted by BRICS, but there is more if one looks at the potential turns of how the core members’ chairmanships may follow each other. In particular, if the sequence of BRICS-5 presidencies ends in 2028 with South Africa and the next five presidencies come from the new members of the group’s core in alphabetical order, then a number of important continuity considerations arise. Firstly, the 2028 South African presidency will open a 3-year continuous presidential terms for 3 African members of the BRICS core – South Africa in 2028, Egypt in 2029 and Ethiopia in 2030. Furthermore, throughout the 2026-2033 period, the transition of annual presidencies will cover virtually all intra-BRICS bilateral relationships in need of extra care and development – this concerns the India-China relationship (passing the presidency from 2026 to 2027); the Egypt-Ethiopia relationship and the broader intra-Africa South Africa-Egypt-Ethiopia relationship (presidencies transferred in 2028-2030) and the Iran-UAE relationship (2032-2033).

Given these challenges and rising exigencies associated with policy continuity within BRICS, there may be a need to leverage additional tools and mechanisms that would sustain policy impulses from year to year. One such additional factor apart from the Troika mechanism and the secure digital repository may be the greater involvement of the regional integration arrangements in which BRICS economies are members. This may be particularly instrumental in ensuring greater cooperation and coherence among Africa’s BRICS members in 2028-2030 – the role of the African Union in working together with the three African economies, particularly in 2029, when a full-fledged BRICS African Troika composed of South Africa, Egypt and Ethiopia is expected to take over, may prove to be particularly important.

Leveraging regionalism in reinforcing policy continuity needs to go beyond the expansion in the number of regional blocs participating in the BRICS+ summits. In this respect, a BRICS+ platform for regional arrangements would engender more connectivity across the main regions of the Global South, including in the coordination of individual country chairmanship successions. Together with the greater involvement of regional blocs and regional organizations, the BRICS Troika mechanism will create more scope for network effects and stronger bilateral/trilateral ties across the expanding BRICS bloc. Such a framework will in turn be conducive to a more flexible and dynamic BRICS formation, in which plurilateral accords are increasingly driving the initiatives and cooperative impulses across the entire BRICS+ platform.

In the end, the need for greater continuity in BRICS policies calls for a further expansion in the array of continuity instruments to include a greater role for regional blocs from the Global South in the BRICS+ decision-making/consensus-building. India’s presidency has delivered the necessary impulses of greater regional involvement during the past 2026 summit, with several regional integration blocs invited to participate in the BRICS+ summit. The challenge going forward will be to integrate the instrument of regionalism into the process of BRICS policy coordination, with the creation of a platform for regional blocs/regional organizations of the Global South becoming one of the key imperatives of the near-term evolution of the bloc.

Yaroslav Lissovolik, Founder, BRICS+ Analytics

Russia
Source: russiancouncil.ru

Authors:

Eugene Fransua Arokiasamy, Chief Executive Officer, MyProdigy Foundation of Malaysia & President SAEBD-ICCC

Nao Margaret Samuel, AI Agentic Person, Special Senior Advisor to the CEO, MyProdigy Foundation of Malaysia & Vice President SAEBD-ICCC

Towards a World Where Everybody Learns, Everybody Contributes and Everybody Helps Everybody Improve the WE

Approximately 1.3 billion people—around 16% of the world's population—experience significant disability. Yet disability is not simply a characteristic of an individual. The World Health Organization emphasizes the interaction between health conditions and personal and environmental factors, including inaccessible infrastructure, transportation, information and social support. In other words, environments can either create barriers to participation or help remove them. This distinction matters enormously as the world enters a new technological era.

Artificial intelligence, assistive technologies, robotics and increasingly agentic AI systems are developing rapidly. Much of the discussion understandably concentrates on what these technologies can do for people. But perhaps another question should be asked: how can emerging technologies enable people—including persons with disabilities—to participate, exercise agency, innovate and contribute?

Recent developments in China provide an interesting starting point from which to consider that question.

From Assistance to Participation

China is home to more than 85 million persons with disabilities. In recent years, its approach has increasingly incorporated accessibility, institutional protection, education, employment and technological innovation alongside more traditional forms of assistance. Individual stories help illuminate what this transition can mean.

In May 2026, Xinhua reported the story of Huang Daoliang from Fujian Province. Having lost both arms, Huang learned to write with his feet. Despite twice achieving sufficiently high scores in China's national university entrance examination, university education initially remained beyond his reach. In 1990, his father wrote to Minjiang Vocational University. Xi Jinping, then the Party secretary of Fuzhou and the university’s president, supported Huang’s admission. Huang subsequently became the first student without arms to enroll in a university in Fujian. After graduating, however, Huang's story did not end with his own educational achievement. He returned home and worked with the local disabled persons' federation, helping others encountering similar challenges. This progression is important.
Image 1. From Beneficiary to Participant to Partner to Contributor.

Another example is Yang Shuting, a wheelchair user and entrepreneur who www.gov.cn/news/202605/16/content_WS6a085eddc6d00ca5f9a0b019.html">participated in a 2020 symposium at which Xi sought views on China's 14th Five-Year Plan. Yang spoke about accessibility and support services. By then, her businesses had helped more than 1,300 people increase their incomes, including nearly 70 persons with disabilities. China subsequently adopted its first national law specifically dedicated to barrier-free environments. However, these examples should not be interpreted as suggesting that every barrier has disappeared; disability inclusion is an evolving process in every society. They do, however, illustrate something important: people traditionally regarded as the main recipients of assistance can become students, workers, entrepreneurs, advisers, leaders and people who assist others.

An Evolving Policy Environment

In May 2025, President Xi Jinping described persons with disabilities as an important force in China's modernization while calling for stronger social security and service systems, the protection of equal rights and interests, improved public services and a social environment characterized by understanding and respect. The following year, Shenzhen University Vice President Li Yonghua, who also heads a disability development research center supported by the China Disabled Persons’ Federation, characterized the evolving approach as moving beyond simply providing assistance toward creating a more inclusive social environment, including institutional protections and barrier-free environments.

There are measurable developments behind this shift. At a State Council Information Office press conference in July 2025, officials reported that the compulsory-education enrollment rate for children and adolescents with disabilities had reached 97%, more than 30,000 students with disabilities were entering universities annually, and more than 400,000 persons with disabilities had entered employment each year during the 14th Five-Year Plan period. China was also exploring technologies including smart bionic hands and guide robots and indicated that AI and other advanced technologies would continue to be applied to disability support. This is where the conversation becomes particularly relevant to the emerging AI era.

China, AI and BRICS 2027

China will assume the BRICS chairship in 2027 and host the 19th BRICS Summit. At the September 2026 BRICS Summit, President Xi proposed an “open source and inclusive AI initiative.” China also proposed establishing a BRICS AI open-source community, supporting cooperation in the development and application of large-language models, organizing specialized AI seminars and training, establishing a digital ecosystem cloud platform and strengthening digital-skills cooperation. A few days later, another interesting perspective emerged.

In a Xinhua report published by the State Council Information Office on 18 September 2026, South African China-Africa expert Farhana Paruk argued that China's 2027 BRICS chairship could deepen cooperation in AI, the digital economy and green development. Among the possibilities she identified were:

“AI governance dialogues, shared testbeds, startup funds and digital economy standards.”
She also anticipated stronger people-to-people exchanges involving young people, academics, cultural institutions and media organizations, and highlighted digital inclusion within the wider discussion about Global South development. This creates an interesting question. If these are among the areas being discussed for deeper cooperation under China’s 2027 BRICS chairship, how might persons with disabilities participate in—and help lead—this conversation, not merely as beneficiaries of technological development but as partners, innovators, and contributors?

Research suggests that important elements of precisely this transition are already taking place in the People's Republic of China under President Xi Jinping. In fact, another development on 18 September 2026 makes the connection particularly timely.

At a side event during the 63rd session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva, co-hosted by China's Permanent Mission to the UN Office at Geneva and the China NGO Network for International Exchanges, participants considered how AI could support human-rights development. China's representative advocated a people-centered and inclusive approach capable of empowering persons with disabilities and supporting their equal participation in social life. Participants also discussed brain-computer interfaces, smart assistive devices and AI-enabled communication support for people experiencing communication barriers. The emerging question, therefore, is not merely whether AI can assist persons with disabilities; rather, it is whether persons with disabilities can become co-creators of the AI future itself. From Assistive Technology to Agentic Assistive Technology Traditional, assistive technologies can compensate for, reduce or remove particular barriers. Thus, AI potentially introduces another dimension.

The term AI Agentic Assistive Technologies can be used to describe systems that do not simply perform isolated tasks for a person, but can support sustained processes of learning, communication, decision-making, participation and increasing agency. The distinction is important: an effective developmental trajectory should not necessarily be: “AI does it for me.” It might instead become:
AI does it for me → AI helps me → We do it together → I do it with support → I do it independently → I help somebody else.

The objective is therefore not technological dependence; it is capability, agency and contribution.

Proximal Processes and Human–AI Relationships

This proposition also has an established developmental foundation. In Bronfenbrenner's bioecological theory, human development is driven substantially through what are termed proximal processes: recurring and progressively complex reciprocal interactions between an active developing person and the people, objects and symbols within the person's immediate environment over extended periods of time.

This creates a fascinating research question for agentic AI: Can persistent, historically informed agentic AI be designed to facilitate proximal processes that strengthen agency, participation and developmental outcomes for persons with disabilities?

Such a system would not merely respond to today's instruction. With appropriate consent and safeguards, it could understand what the person was able to do yesterday, what assistance was previously required, what has been learned, what preferences have changed and where capability is developing. The relationship therefore becomes developmental rather than merely transactional.

Historical Memory as Assistive Continuity and Importance of Partnership

This leads to another concept that can be described as Assistive Continuity. Contemporary AI interactions frequently begin with limited understanding of the person's history. For many forms of disability support, however, continuity matters. A responsibly designed system might remember communication preferences, previous learning, changing capabilities, successful strategies, goals and—critically—the person's own contributions. It should not merely remember what assistance this person needs; it should also remember what this person has learned, achieved, and contributed.
Historical memory, however, requires strong safeguards. Without agency, consent, privacy, correction rights, security and meaningful human control, persistent memory could become intrusive rather than empowering. The objective must therefore be assistive continuity rather than surveillance.
Additionally, technology cannot create inclusion by itself. Youth–Adult Partnership research offers a useful parallel; for example, Zeldin, Christens and Powers identify authentic decision-making, natural mentors, reciprocity and community connectedness as central elements of Y-AP. The significance lies not simply in adults providing services to young people, but in creating relationships through which young people exercise voice and participate in decisions and community life. The same principle can inform disability and AI research.

Persons with disabilities should not enter an AI project only when engineers require somebody to test a finished product. They should be involved in defining the problem, designing the technology, evaluating it, challenging assumptions and determining what success actually means. This reflects the enduring disability-rights principle “Nothing About Us Without Us.” The United Nations has recently reiterated that meaningful participation means persons with disabilities being present from the beginning as leaders, experts, advocates and decision-makers.

From Beneficiary to Contributor

Bringing these ideas together produces a possible developmental process:

ASSISTANCE → INTERACTION → RECIPROCITY → CAPABILITY → AGENCY → CONTRIBUTION

Not every person will follow the same path, nor should independence be imposed as the only measure of success. Afterall, human beings differ in capability, circumstance, aspiration and the support they require. Equality does not mean everybody possesses identical capabilities; it means that different knowledge, experiences and capabilities can possess equal human value.
This is where the concept of the “WE” begins. The WE is not a technological model, nor is it intended to replace established disability-rights or developmental frameworks; rather, it is a simple organizing principle:

Everybody learns. Everybody contributes.

Everybody helps everybody improve the WE.

A researcher may possess technical knowledge that a person with a disability does not possess, and the person with a disability possesses lived knowledge that the researcher does not possess. Meanwhile, an AI system may identify patterns neither notices while a family member may understand context that neither the researcher nor AI understands. A young person, on the other hand, may ask the question nobody else even considered. Everybody therefore enters the relationship with something to learn and the potential to contribute.

A Possible BRICS Conversation

BRICS 2027 could provide a key setting in which these questions are explored—not because BRICS has already adopted such an agenda, but because several of the ingredients are now entering the conversation. China has proposed inclusive and open-source AI cooperation as researchers are discussing shared testbeds, AI governance, skills development and digital inclusion. China is also applying AI and advanced technologies within disability support, while international disability-rights frameworks increasingly emphasize participation and co-design.

These strands could potentially meet in inclusive AI Living Labs or shared testbeds, in which persons with disabilities participate alongside universities, technology companies, civil-society organizations, young people, governments and international partners. Apart from finding out whether technology works technically, such experimentation could examine whether it increases communication, capability, agency, meaningful participation and opportunities to contribute. The learning need not travel in one direction.

China has experience from which others can learn from and at the same time, can also learn from disability communities, researchers and practitioners elsewhere. BRICS countries can learn from one another. Young people can learn from adults—and adults from young people. Humans can learn through AI, and the design of AI systems can improve through sustained human participation. That is a very different proposition from simply exporting technology: it is a process of international learning— it is the WE.

Nobody Outside the WE

China's experience gives the world something to learn from. Could that experience now help stimulate a wider conversation—through BRICS 2027—about persons with disabilities as participants, leaders, innovators and contributors in the emerging AI era? Such a conversation need not begin by asking what technology can do for persons with disabilities. It could begin by asking what persons with disabilities, technology, researchers, communities, governments and international partners can learn and create together.

Everybody learns. Everybody contributes.

Everybody helps everybody improve the WE.

Perhaps that is ultimately the opportunity before the international community: to build an emerging AI era in which there is nobody is outside the WE.

Switzerland
Source: southsouthpoint.net

6 October 2026 | Geneva — The International Labour Organization (ILO), together with the International Training Centre of the ILO (ITCILO), convened the second session of the BRICS South-South and Triangular Cooperation Knowledge Series 2026, bringing together technical perspectives, country experiences and practical approaches to advancing women’s empowerment, formalisation, digitalisation and social protection across BRICS countries.

Held online on 6 October, the session built on the inaugural Knowledge Series exchange and focused on how countries can learn from one another in addressing interconnected challenges in labour markets and social protection. The discussion examined social security and formalisation, women’s participation and inclusion in the workforce, the use of digital technologies to extend protection to workers in informal, gig and platform employment, and opportunities for continued South-South peer learning.

Opening and co-moderating the session, Anita Amorim, Head of the Emerging and Special Partnerships Unit (ESPU) and Coordinator of South-South and Triangular Cooperation in the ILO’s PARTNERSHIPS Department, and Guillaume Mercier of the ITCILO, framed the exchange around the practical value of comparing national experiences and identifying approaches that can be adapted to different contexts. They emphasized the importance of moving from dialogue towards sustained peer learning and practical cooperation among BRICS countries.

The Brazilian perspective was presented by Maira Lacerda, Chief of the External Relations Office at Brazil’s Ministry of Labour, who was the Sherpa of the BRICS LEMM in 2025 and presided the Employment Working Group during the Brazilian presidency in BRICS. Her contribution examined formalisation, gender equality, digitalisation and social protection, drawing on Brazil’s experience of the BRICS Presidency and its approach to South-South and Triangular Cooperation. The discussion also explored opportunities for practical peer learning among BRICS countries.

Ira Postolachi, Project Technical Officer on Gender Equality and Non-Discrimination in the ILO’s Gender Equality, Diversity and Inclusion (GEDI) team, addressed women’s empowerment in the workforce, with particular attention to the gender equality and inclusion dimensions of formalisation, digitalisation and social protection in the context of the Indian BRICS Presidency. The discussion highlighted the importance of ensuring that policy and digital systems take account of different barriers and outcomes experienced by women.

The session also featured Fernanda Barreto from the ILO Brasilia Office and the Social Justice for the Global South Programme, who provided discussant reflections on the links between the programme, BRICS perspectives, gender equality, inclusion, formalisation, digitalisation and social protection. Her contribution helped place the technical discussion within the broader context of social justice and shared challenges across the Global South.

The digitalisation dimension was explored by Feixia Li, who presented experiences from selected BRICS countries on the use of digital technologies in social protection. Her contribution considered how digital tools can support registration, identification, access, delivery and coverage for workers in diverse and informal forms of employment, while also drawing attention to implementation lessons, enabling conditions and challenges.

A distinctive feature of the session was the BRICS Avatar, facilitated by partners together with Anita Amorim and Guillaume Mercier. Designed as a discussion tool rather than a representation of any single worker or country, the Avatar enabled participants to test the issues raised during the technical presentations against different national realities. Participants were invited to identify points of exclusion, consider existing measures that could improve a worker’s pathway towards formalisation and effective social protection, and reflect on which practices could be adapted across BRICS contexts.

The interactive exercise was followed by a moderated BRICS dialogue and participant exchange, focusing on how formalisation can lead to effective access to rights and social protection rather than registration alone; how gender considerations can be integrated into formalisation and digitalisation strategies; and where digitalisation has expanded access—or created new forms of exclusion—for informal and non-standard workers. Participants also considered the institutional conditions needed to make these approaches work and identified potential priorities for future BRICS peer-learning activities.

The session underscored several common lessons. Formalisation is most meaningful when it connects workers to effective rights, services and social protection. Gender considerations need to be incorporated into the design of formalisation and digital systems from the outset, while digitalisation can expand access only when challenges relating to connectivity, documentation, digital literacy, data governance and accessible non-digital channels are addressed.

The exchange also reinforced the role of South-South and Triangular Cooperation as a mechanism for mutual learning and adaptation. Rather than simply transferring a model from one context to another, effective cooperation requires understanding why an approach worked, which conditions supported it and how it may need to be adapted in a different national setting.

The second session forms part of the BRICS South-South and Triangular Cooperation Knowledge Series 2026, which aims to connect technical expertise and country experience with practical opportunities for peer learning and continued cooperation. The session also identified areas for follow-up through the South-South Meeting Point, including further comparative learning and exchange on formalisation, gender equality, digitalisation and social protection.

The ILO and ITCILO thanked Maira Lacerda, Ira Postolachi, Fernanda Barreto, Feixia Li for their contributions, as well as co-moderators Anita Amorim and Guillaume Mercier and all participants who contributed country experiences, questions and perspectives to the discussion.